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1. INTRODUCTION
Legal recognition that sexual harassment is sex discrimination in em-
ployment would help women break the bond between material survival
and sexual exploitation. It would support and legitimize women's eco-
nomic equality and sexual self-determination at a point at which the
two are linked.'
Both legal and economic analyses support recognition of on-the-job
sexual harassment2 as a form of sex discrimination in employment.
Many sexually harassed women are left legally remediless. Economic
equality for women workers would be promoted if sexual harassment
were recognized as sex discrimination. Moreover, the recognition of
sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination in employment
would alter the subordinate and economically powerless role which
most women workers traditionally represent and which facilitates a set-
ting for sexual harassment.
In addition to legal recognition of employment discrimination based
upon sexual harassment, courts should provide complete remedies for
sexual harassment victims. Presently, many sexi'ally harassed victims
are pursuing legal redress through Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.' which prohibits sex discrimination in employment. Remedies
under Title VII are limited, however, because in many instances Title
VII fails to provide adequate and complete relief to sexually harassed
victim.' Examination of both the language and judicial interpreta-
tions of Title VII. and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion's [EEOC'sI recently promulgated guidelines incorporating sexual
harassment into Title VIl's prohibitions, discloses three areas where Ti-
tle VII falls short. First. specific acts or conduct which arguably consti-
tute sexual harassment are not encompassed in the case law of the
EEOC's definition of sexual harassment.' Second. an employer's liabil-
ity is limited for the sexually harassing acts of employees and custom-
ers." Third. Title VII does not allow an award of compensatory and
punitive damages.? These three deficiencies collectively work against a
sexually-harassed victim, preventing complete and adequate relief in
some instances, and any relief in others.
Inadequate remedies for sexual harassment also reinforce the eco-
nomically inferior employment positions of women in two ways. First.
I C .c KISNON. SL.XUAL iIARA5SMI-.NT OI WORKIN.(, WOMNI 7 (i979).
2 For discussion of several definitions and types of sexual harassment. see rn/ru notes 26-36
and accompanying tcxt
3 ('vil Rights Act of 1964. § 701.42 U.S.C § 2000c (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
4 See' infra notes 210-58 and accompanying text.
5 See in/ra notes 87-135 and accompanying text.
6 .See infra notes 136-204 and accompanying text.
7 See tnfra notes 210-52 and accompanying text.
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inadequate legal recognition of all acts and conduct which constitute
sexual harassment, limited employer liability, and inadequate, ineffec-
tive damage awards perpetuate the traditional dominant male employ-
ment position." Second, employment related economic consequences.
such as decreases in productivity, increases in absenteeism and unem-
ployment, and barriers to employment opportunities. are also
perpetuated.'
The pervasiveness of sexual harassment in the employment context
calls for immediate action. Several studies indicate that on-the-job sex-
ual harassment is more widespread than officially reported. Results of
a 1975 survey conducted by the Working Women's Institute indicated
that of the 165 women sampled, seventy percent had experienced on-
the-job sexual harassment at least once.' 0 In 1976, Redbook Magazine
conducted a survey on sexual harassment to which 9,000 women re-
plied." The Redbook survey discovered that eighty-eight percent of
the women had experienced sexual harassment on the job.'- A Merit
Systems Protection Board study on federal government employment
revealed that forty-two percent of the women and 15.3 percent of the
men surveyed had experienced sexual harassment.'3
The prevalence of sexual harassment at the workplace leads to seri-
ous psychological, physical and economic side effects. Other studies
conducted by the Working Women's Institute have indicated that
ninety percent of sexual harassment victims surveyed experience ner-
vousness, fear, and anger; sixty-three percent experience nausea, head-
t.ee inra noteS 312-74 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 375-98 and accompanying text.
10 Working Women's Institute. Sexual Harassment on the Job--Results of Prehminars' Sur-
se,. Research Series Report No. I (1975). In this survey. the Working Women's Institute defined
sexual harassment as "any repeated. unwanted sexual comments. suggestions or physical contact
that you find objectionable or offensive and causes you discomfort on the job." (Publications of
the Working Women's Institute can be obtained from 593 Park Avenue. New York City. New
York )
I I. Safran. What ,len Do to women on the Job: .4 Shocking Look at Sexual llarassment
Ri.tiootK Nov. 1976. at 149. [hereinafter cited as Redbook Studyl.
12. The Redbook Survey explained that:
nearly 9 out of 10 women report that they have experienced one or more forms of unwanted
attenton on the job. This can be visual (leering and ogling) or verbal (sexual remarks and
teasing). It can escalate to pinching, grabbing and touching. to subtle hints and pressures. to
overt requests for dates and sexual favors--with the implied threat that it will go against the
woman if she refuses.
Id
13. U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD. Sexual flaraisment in the Federal JPorkplace".
1s It a Problem? (1981). reprinted in 107 L~a. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 23 (News and Background
Information Part I1: Sexual Harassment and Labor Relations) 28 (July 20. 1981) [hereinafter cited
as Merit Systems Protection Board Studyl. The Merit Systems Protection Board Study did not
explicitly define sexual harassment, but it did explain that of those surveyed. the respondents
stated they had experienced sexual harassment in -some form." Id
Moreover. while it is also important to study the sexual harassment of men. that subject is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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aches and tiredness; seventy-five percent state that sexual harassment
interferes with their job performance; and sixty-six percent are either
fired or pressured into resigning. 4 Moreover, sexual harassment is not
dependent upon a woman's economic class,' 5 race,'" occupation,"' mar-
ital status,'" or age.'9 For example, the Working Women's Institute de-
termined that sexual harassment victims include teachers. factory
workers, professionals, waitresses, clerical workers, executives, and
domestics.20
Sexual harassment is not a new employment problem: women have
experienced sexual harassment ever since they entered the labor
force.-' However. it is only a recently litigated issue because women
were too embarrassed or too afraid to speak out.-2  Sexual harassment
cases are usually brought under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
though occasionally under tort law.2  Sexual harassment cases have
presented the courts with novel opportunities to decide the extent to
which Title VII will provide remedies to sexually harassed victims. As
a result. standards for a meritorious claim under Title VII have been
inconsistent.24 Given this inconsistency and confusion, a sexual harass-
ment case under Title VII is ripe for Supreme Court review.
The economic impact of sexual harassment also needs review. Al-
14 Working Women's Institute. The Impact of Se.tual ilarassment on the Job. .4 Prolil oJ'th"
Etp'riences of' 2 Women. Research Series Report No. 3 19791: P. Crull. The Sress F:'c0.1 o/"
.Ve'tual /larassment. Asi. J. ORTIIOPSYCI'IATRY (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter cited as
('rull Stress Effects Studyl. The Crull Stress Effects Study may be obtained from the Working
Womcn'N Institute
15 See C M ~cKx.o.. supra note I. at 28-29 (footnotes omitted): Redhxok Stud%..Vupra
note II. at 217. 219
16. See. e. . Mtller v. Bank of America. 600 F 2d 211 (9th Cir 1979) (black female cmplo ce
,,cxuallv harassed b-, white male supervisor): Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co.. 441 F Supp. 459
tL D hMich. 1977) (black female employee sexuall) harassed by white male supervi.sor). Barnes v.
Cotle. 561 F 2d 983 (D C. Cir 1977) (black female employee sexually harassed by black male
,upCrvM)r) See also C MM( KiNNoN. supra note I. at 28-31 (footnotes omitted). Crull Stress
'lfects Stud, . upra note 14 (about twenty per cent of the sample consisted of inority women).
17 See Redbook Study. supra note I I. at 217. 219 (rcspoindcnts included women from pro-
le.siiunal. managerial, white- and blue-collar jobs); Crull Stress Earects Study. .rupru note 14 (re-
,pondents included %,omen working in sales, managerial. administrative. professional. technical.
ersicc. clerical. craft. operative. transport equipment operatives, non-farm laborer, farm, and pri-
,,ate household positions)
18 See Rcdbook Study..iupra note 1I. at 217. 219 (respondents included single. married, and
di',orced women): Working Women's Institute. Research Series Report No. 3..rupra note 14 (re-
spondents included single. separated. divorced, and widowed women).
19 Ser Redbook Study. .supra note II. at 217. 219 (respondents* ages ranged from teens to
sixtcsI: Crull Stress Effects Study. supra note 14 (respondents' ages ranged from sixteen to sixty-
fi,, 0.
20 Working Womcn's Institute. Research Report Series No. 1..supra note 10. See also .supra
note 17
21. See .. FARLLY. St.XUAL SHAKEDt)OwN 28-44 (1978).
22 Id at 26: C. MA( K-.os. supra note I. at 27-28.
23 See infra notes 283-311 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 195-209 and accompan,,ing text.
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though many non-economists have considered the economic conse-
quences a sexually harassed victim experiences."' economists have
neither analyzed sexual harassment as sex discrimination using eco-
nomic models nor considered the overall economic results of sexual
harassment.
This article proposes that sexual harassment at the workplace is a
form of sex discrimination on both legal and economic bases. The arti-
cle discusses the definitions and types of sexual harassment. Title VII
and the recently promulgated EEOC guidelines on sexual harassment
are reviewed. The present state of sexual harassment case law is then
thoroughly discussed in terms of the three problems with recovery
under Title VII: sexually harassing acts not included in Title VII; lim-
ited employer liability. and inadequate and incomplete damages. As
an alternative form of recovery, possible tort remedies are briefly
reviewed.
The second part of the article concerns the economic impact of sex-
ual harassment. First, economic models are briefly considered. Sec-
ond. the "twofold" economic impact of sexual harassment is discussed.
The twofold economic impact provides that sexual harassment is a
form of sex discrimination because both sexually harassing and other
sex discriminatory acts achieve and reinforce the same purpose: the
..superior" sex exerting power and dominance over the "inferior" sex.
The second economic impact concerns overall economic results of sex-
ual harassment which are in the nature of a consequence of
discrimination.
The article concludes with a presentation of a model statute prohibit-
ing sexual harassment at the workplace. Taking account of the eco-
nomic and legal implications, this model statute provides an adequate
and complete remedy for sexually harassed victims.
II. SEXUAL HARASSMENT: BACKGROUND
A. Definitions of Sexual harassment
Sexual harassment may be defined in several ways. Catherine
MacKinnon broadly defined sexual harassment as "including the un-
wanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a relation-
ship of unequal power."26 The inclusion of "power" or "dominance"
in the description of sexual harassment is meaningful and many defini-
tions of on the job sexual harassment include these descriptive terms.
Social psychologists Harriet Connolly and Judith Greenwald describe
sexual harassment as follows:
25. See infra notes 375-98 and accompanying text.
26 C. MAcKi.%.-os. rupra note I. at 1.
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Structurally. both types of actions junnsolicited sexual demands as a
condition of working or unsolicited sexual intimidation] usually are ini-
tiated by someone with power against someone with lesser power. not
the other way around. In a word, they are nonreciprocal. The second
structural similarity is the element of coercion. that is. it is either stated
or implied there will be negative consequences if the women refuses to
acquiese and/or comply. These actions function to assert superior
power.
2 7
The power issue does not relate only to female employees who are
sexually harassed by their male supervisors. It also includes female
employees who are sexually harassed by their co-workers and their em-
ployer's customers or clients. Sex-role conditioning explains why wo-
men workers "have been socialized to powerlessness" -' and men
workers, including co-workers, clients and customers, have been social-
ized to assert dominance.-1 Male employees and male customers may
believe they have, and even exercise. "greater power" over female em-
ployees, although in the actual hierarchial employment structure. the
males hold the same rank. or lower rank, than the females.
Lin Farley's definition of sexual harassment includes "unsolicited
nonreciprocal male behavior that asserts a woman's sex role over her
function as worker."'" She then narrowed the issue: "the name of the
game is dominance."'
Understanding sexual harassment would not be complete without a
definition by the Working Women's Institute. The Working Women's
Institute defines sexual harassment as "any attention of a sexual nature
in the context of the work situation which has the effect of making a
woman uncomfortable on the job. impeding her ability to do her work
or interferring with her employment opportunities."'3  The Working
Women's Institute explained "[wihether it takes place in the office or
the factory, sexual harassment is the assertion of power by men over
women who are perceived to be in a vulnerable position with respect to
male authority."'
27 L l'.kRLI N. .upra note 21. at 17. Farley quotes the statements of Connollk and Green-
wald but she does not cite any specific source.
28. Id at 16.
29. Id at 16-17. See also Rossetn. Sex Discrimmaiton and the Se.tuall" Chatted uAr Fnlt.
ronment. 9 N.Y.U. RLv. L. & S(x. Ci.NSik 271. 273-74 n.12 (1979-H0) (sxual harassment ex-
presses a stereotypic view that men are the sexual initiators exercising control over the weaker.
vulnerable sex).
30. L. FARLIEY. supra note 21. at 14-15.
31. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
32. Vermuelen. Comments on the Equal Emplo;vnenl Opporturnr Conm,onr Proposed
.4mendment Adding Section 1604. //. Serual larassment to tts Guidelines on Se rual Durcruninatton.
6 WOS.LN's Rrs. L. Riv. 285. 286 (1980) (Joan Vcrmuelcn is the Director of the Working Wo-
men's Institute. National Sexual Harassment Legal Back-up Center. The goal of the Institute is to
combat the problem of sexual harassment in the employment context).
33. Id.
6
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Although several other commentators have defined sexual harass-
ment. 4 the foregoing definitions, given by four of the earliest and most
prominent advocates involved in the problems associated with sexual
harassment, will suffice for a general social definition of sexual harass-
ment. A technical legal definition, however, is different from those
given above.
One of the most recent legal definitions of sexual harassment is given
in the EEOC's guidelines on sexual harassment." The EEOC's guide-
lines define sexual harassment as "'[unwelcome sexual advances, re-
quests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of sexual
nature ... ."3t A detailed discussion of the EEOC's guidelines and
sexual harassment as a violation of Title VII is given in section II-B of
this article.
Types of sexual harassment vary in degree and should be considered
broadly. Examples of sexual harassment include, but are not limited
to. the following: staring. ogling, any kind of unsolicited touching (in-
cluding -accidental" brushing), verbal and nonverbal criticizing and
commenting upon an individual's body, unsolicited grabbing. kissing.
squeezing. smacking. pinching, and pulling part of an individual's body
(including hair), unsolicited propositions. suggestions and demands for
dates and/or involvement in sexual activity, posting or placing near an
individual's work environment an obscene picture (excluding recog-
nized artwork), derogatory jokes and pictures, and forced sexual activ-
itv (including rape).3 1
Upon examining both the social and legal definitions of sexual har-
assment and the several types of sexually harassing acts articulated
above, an exhaustive definition encompassing all possible types of sex-
ually harassing behavior is not achieved. Several questions are left
open concerning what other types of behavior may also constitute sex-
ual harassment.
Although some types of sexual harassment might appear to be in a
'complimentary" form (through the eyes of the complimentor). sexual
harassment also includes derogatory and humiliating remarks, criti-
cisms. and jokes about an individual's body, attire, weight, general ap-
pearance and mannerisms.3 "  This disparaging type of sexual
34 'ee. eg . Rosscin. .upra note 29. at 272. Nte. Serual Hlarassment in the H"Wrkplactt" .4
Prattntoner'r Guide to Tort Actions. 10 GOLDI.N GATI 879. 879-80 (1980) ihereinafter cited as
Guide to Trt .Actiont I: Note. Sexual Ilarassment and Title VI1: The Foundationfor the Flininatton
oqSetual Cvoperatton asuan EmpIolment Condition. 76 Mic-t. L. REv. 1007. 1007 n.2 (1978) Ihere-
,nater cited a3. Setual llarassmeni and Title 1711.
35 29CFR.§ 1604.11 11980).
36 Id
37 .er- C Sm Kmi..-t). supra note I. at 2: L. FARLh.Y. ynpra note 21. at 15.
3H See Krt,j v. Western Elem. Co.. 461 F. Supp 894 (ID.N.J. 1978).
7
Andrews: The Legal and Economic Implications of Sexual Harassment
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1983
NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL L41ViJOURN.4L
harassment is not addressed specifically in the EEOC's definition of
sexual harassment. A more thorough definition should include this
type of behavior because it is directed at a person's sex for the purpose
of harassing him or her. Sexually derogatory harassment is also an-
other way of fulfilling the harasser's purpose of exerting dominance
over more vulnerable person. As Farley pointed out, "Islexual harass-
ment is nevertheless an act of aggression at any stage of its expression
and in all forms, it contributes to the ultimate goal of keeping women
subordinate at work."3 9
The EEOC's definition of sexual harassment is incomplete for yet
another reason. The guidelines fail to include nonverbal sexually
harassing acts. Sexual jokes. cartoons, other printed matter. and sexual
and other nonverbal gestures are sources of nonverbal sexual harass-
ment which may be used to humiliate. degrade. and possibly endanger
a person."' This criticism of the guidelines is outlined more fully in
section III-D-2.
Another issue not clarified by the social and the EEOC's definitions
of sexual harassment concerns whether the victim must aflirmativelv
reject or resist the sexual harassment. This issue can be broken down
into two types of situations: where the victim tolerates sexual harass-
ment but does not submit to sexual advances: and where the victim
acquiesces or submits to sexual harassment. The former situation in-
volves victims who fear losing their jobs if they affirmatively resist sex-
ual harassment by requesting the harasser to stop or reporting the
harasser's conduct to a supervisor. These victims would tolerate the
offensive but subtle forms of sexual harassment. like "'accidental"
brushings or verbal sexual remarks. In this instance, resistance or re-
jection is not necessary because it is apparent that a sexually harassing
act occurred." The sexually harassing act was unwelcome, unsolicited
and intimidating.
The latter situation also involves victims who fear retaliatory dismis-
sals if they do not acquiesce in the sexual advances.' - In this instance.
39 L1-. 1-.kL '. rupra note 21. at 15.
40. See. eg . K rsati v Western Elcc. Co. 461 F. Supp .94 (D N J. 1971S; (defendant,, pl.ccd
obscene cart xs on plaintitis desk). Gu~cttc v. Stautfer (hem Co. 5IX I Supp 521 it)N J
NMI) (defendants physically endangered plaintiffs by placing hazardous chemical% in the plant,%
above their desk.)
41. Contra Fletcher v. Greiner. 106 MNic. 2d 564. 435 N.Y.S.2d 1005 WOO$0) %%here the court
dismissed plaintttrs sexual harassment claim explaining that sexual suggestions mut be un'.cl-
come and rejected for a successful cause of action Id at 571. 435 N Y.S.2d at 1010
42. This as not only a fear of many sexually harassed women but actual dismissals arc one ol
the effects of scsual harassment. See Working Women's Institute. Research Scrics Report No 3.
supraj note 14 (of the 92 women in the sample. 24 percent were fired and 42 percent were prcs.,urcd
into resigning). See aiso Miller v Bank of America. 418 F Supp. 233 IN 1) Cal 1976. rerdand
remanded. 600 F 2d 211 19th Cir. 19791 (plaintiff dismissed ror refual to comply . ith %upcr,.',or',
,exual advances)
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economic coercion takes the place of physical coercion and these vic-
tims believe they must choose between submission to sexual advances
or dismissal from employment. If the sexual advances are unsolicited.
unwelcome and hostile or intimidating, an affirmative rejection of these
acts would clearly constitute sexual harassment. 13 Why, then. would
reluctant acquiescence to these same unsolicited, unwelcome and in-
timidating sexual advances not constitute sexual harassment? It is sug-
gested that a complete definition of sexual harassment would include
unsolicited and unwelcome sexual advances to which a victim reluc-
tantly submits.
A related issue should also be considered at this point. Sexual har-
assment may occur where a previously mutual relationship has ended
and the "spurned lover" is presently in an employment situation to sex-
ually harass the former lover. The existence of a previously mutual
relationship does not foreclose the possibility of sexual harassment oc-
curring in the future. If the spumed lover makes an unsolicited and
unwelcome sexual advance toward the former lover, then the spurned
lover's acts constitute sexual harassment.
In summary, the necessary elements for an exhaustive definition of
sexual harassment are outlined below. First, sexual harassment is any
type of behavior, acts, or conduct which has the effect of expressing
sexual attention toward another person. Second, the sexual attention is
unsolicited and unwelcome although not necessarily rejected. Third.
sexual attention includes, but is not limited to. sexual advances, re-
quests for sexual favors, any other written. printed, verbal, nonverbal.
or physical conduct of a sexual nature, whether expressed in a "'compli-
mentary" or derogatory nature. Fourth. the unsolicited and unwel-
come sexual attention occurs within the employment context and
submission to or tolerance of such attention is expressly or impliedly a
condition of employment, or submission to or refusal of such attention
is taken account of when determining employment opportunities, bene-
fits, promotions, transfers, or demotions pertaining to the sexually
harassed employee, or such attention affects the harassed employee by
creating a demeaning, offensive, uncomfortable, hostile, or intimidating
employment atmosphere.
The suggested elements of a sexual harassment definition set forth
above are proposed as an exhaustive review encompassing all situa-
tions which might constitute sexual harassment in the employment con-
text. This definition is broad enough to be considered as both a legal
and social definition of sexual harassment. Furthermore, the power
and dominance issue, underlying several of the social definitions, is di-
43. See Henson v. CBta of Dundce. 682 F.2d 897 (11 th Cir. 1982): Bund v. Jacksn. 641 : 2d
934 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Mffler v. Bank of Amnefica. 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1479).
9
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rected specifically toward explaining why sexual harassment occurs.
This issue is more relevant when considering the scope of an em-
ployer's liability and adequate and complete remedial measures for
sexually harasssed victims.
B. Title VII and the EEOC Guidelines
For a better understanding of sexual harassment claims under Title
VII. a review of the EEOC's functions. the newly enacted guidelines.
Title VlI's legislative history, and the statutory requirements and limi-
tations is helpful. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act states that l'it
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms.
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
. . . sex. .... 44
The EEOC's duties include upholding the spirit of and preventing
any violations of Title VI1. 45 The EEOC may uphold Title VII by su-
ing the violating employer ' when the employer's status is covered
under Title V1 47 and the charge filed by the "aggrieved" employee was
not first resolved informally by the EEOC.4 " An aggrieved employee
may not sue an employer directly under Title VII without first filing a
complaint with the EEOC.4"
The EEOC has authority to issue procedural regulations aiding in
the administration and enforcement of Title VII. 50 The EEOC does
not. however, have authority to issue substantive regulations.:' Never-
theless. the EEOC issues guidelines to determine whether a violation of
Title VII has occurred and to make a public statement concerning its
interpretation of Title V11:2 Although the guidelines are only regula-
tions, many courts, including the United States Supreme Court. have
44. Ctil Rights Act of 1964. § 703. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2 (1976).
45. Id § 706.
46. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976).
47. An employer's status is covered under Title Vii when he or she is engaged in an industr%
affecting commerce and has at least fifteen emplo,ees or when the employer is the government.
Civil Rights Act of 1964. § 701(b). 42 U.S.C. § 2000c(b) (1976): § 71 7(a). 42 U.S.C. § 2(XX)-161a)
(Supp. V 1981)
48. Civil Rights Act of 1964. § 706. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-5 (1976). The EEOC conducts an
investigation, and if it discovers no "'reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true." it may
dismiss the charge. Id If reasonable cause exists, then informal methods of conference. conciha-
tion. and persuasion are used in an attempt to eliminate the discrimination. Id
49. Id See also Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs.. Inc.. 511 F. Supp. 307. 310 (N.D. ill.
1981).
50 Civil Rights Act of 1964. § 713(a). 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-12(a) (1976).
51. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert. 429 U.S. 125. 141 (1976).
52. See McLain. The EEOC Sexual Ilarassment Guidelnes.- Welcome .4drances Under Tile
17/? 10 U. BALT. L. Ri-v. 275. 286-88 (1981).
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given "great deference"" to EEOC guidelines unless a court deems the
guidelines as inconsistent with former guidelines or a misinterpretation
of the statute.54
When determining whether guidelines "express the will of Con-
gress," the court should consider the act itself and its legislative his-
tory." Determining the relevance of Title VII to sexual harassment is
difficult. The legislative history of Title VII's inclusion of sex within its
provisions is scant. "1 6 In fact, several commentators have suggested that
sex was added to the prohibition of Title VII in an attempt to block
passage of the Act." The actual implications of including sex in Title
VII were never discussed nor considered in Congress prior to its
enactment. "
Responding to the lack of history, the EEOC promulgated the fol-
lowing guidelines on discrimination based on sex:
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Section 703 of
Title Vii. Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual
harassment when (i) submission to such conduct is made either explic-
itly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment.
(2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used
as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or
(3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interferring
with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment. "
When determining whether a violation of Title VII has occurred, the
EEOC will consider "the record as a whole and . . . the totality of the
circumstances . . . on a case by case basis."' The guidelines empha-
size that an employer is strictly liable for sexual harassment of employ-
ees by the employer's agents and supervisory personnel despite the
53 Griggs % Duke Power Co.. 401 U.S 424. 433-34 (1971) (citations omitted)
54 See McLain. upra note 52. at 287-88.
55 (;rig., v. Duke Power Co.. 401 U.S. 424. 434 (1971).
56 See Vaa,. Tle Vk1 Legislanrvelhstar. 7 B.C.I.ND. & CoM L. RiV 431. 441-42 1 14t,b.
Sirota. Set D,.wrmmation: Tide Vii and the Bana fIde Occupational Quahyi'ation. 55 1 x 1.
Rt v 1025. 1027 (1977). See also Come v. Bausch and Lomb Inc.. 390 F. Supp. 161. 163 Ii). Ar/
19751 (quoting Diaz v. Pan Am. Airways. Inc.. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971)1.
57 See Vaas. supra note 56: Freed & Polsby. Prrracrl tffiienc; and the Equatar ta .h'en and
I~omen. A Revisonist View ofSex Discrimination in Employmewn. 1981 Asa. B. f-oust). Rist..%Rt ii
J. 583: McLain. supra note 52. at 282.
58. See Vaas. supra note 56. at 439-42. Vaas explained that Representative Smith "otfered
his amendment laddng sex to Title VIII in a spirit of satire and ironic cajolery." Id at 441. The
Ilouse debate was brief and no heanngs were held but the amendment passed 168 to 133. Id. at
442.
59. 29C'F.R.§ 1604.11 (1982).
60. Id
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employer's lack of knowledge.' On the other hand, the employer is
only liable for sexually harassing actions by co-workers "where the em-
ployer (or its agents or supervisory emnployees) knows or should have
known the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and ap-
propriate corrective action." 2 The same rule applies to 'nonemploy-
ees" (e.g., customers, clients) taking account of the employer's 'control
and any other legal responsibility" that the employer has in relation to
the conduct of such nonemployee. 3
The guidelines clearly show that the best way to end sexual harass-
ment is to prevent it." Preventive measures include explaining to em-
ployees their right to be free from sexual harassment and their rights
and remedies under Title VII. employment policies against sexual har-
assment. and an internal complaint procedure and punishment for
violators. "5
The guidelines conclude that an employer nnar be liable for an indi-
vidual's submission to sexual advances in return for enhanced employ-
ment opportunities." The employer could be charged with
discriminating against employees who were qualified For the emplo. -
ment advancement but were denied. ' This concluding subsection of
the guidelines has created controversy among commentators."' Invoca-
tion of this subsection has not yet reached the courts for interpretation
and enforcement.
Although not mentioned in the guidelines, damages are recoverable
under Title VII by victims of sexual harassment." Another salient is-
sue of concern to many commentators7"' involves the limited scope of"
61 Id. See generally Vermuclen. Emplai er Liabdti Under 7"th" J I1.1"r S'i'tuul Ilar.a i,'t
hi Superrisor- Emp/.reer. 10 CAI-. U L Ri.v. 499 11991). I)esmarai% & I)cmnjrji%. .4dianci i
4drancementr Emphrer Liahtltirfor Sc'rual.4ds'ances Under Equal emhi ment oppr)niati Com.
nrsilon Guidelines. 17 (o.-z L. Ri % I 119811. But fee Waks & Starr. Seual Ilaral.jent it the
11 orA Place The Scope qfEmphPier Labilitay. 7 E-I'u uyl I Ri 1 I. J 369. 371-77. 38h ( 1M.2)
62. 29 CFR § l6t04-11 t1982)
63 Id
64 Id
65 See id See alw Waks & Starr. supra note 61. at 384-8.
66 29 C |.R. § 160 4.11 (1982) (cnphasi added).
67. Id
68 Compare Levcntcr. Se cual Ilara ssment and 7)le 17/- EEOC Guidelinea. C(nd,,aons Litu.
.cation. and the 'nttedStates Supreme Court. 10 CAP. U L. Rt v 481. 485 & n 20 1198 1) (,.uhscc-
tion of guideline assumes women "'sleep their way to the top- %hich reinforce% scxlsl stereotv pCl
ath Waks & Starr. supra note 61. at 382 (in light of media attention to "'cL-rclated .appoint-
ments" time will tell whether this subscction will be enforced; subsection will do more harm than
good for women's equality in employicnt). See also infra notes 243-48 and accompanying text.
69. See Civil Rights Act of 1964. § 706. 42 U.S.C. § 20 0 0-5(g) (1976),
70.. See Vermuclen. Comments on the Equal Empluoament Opportunti' ('ntn.lt.$Son Prp it'd
.4mendment .4dding Section 16}.1 // Seual Harassment to its Gutdeltner on Se tua/ Di. crtmnation.
6 Wot '.s RTS. L. RLP. 285. 294 (1980): Oneglia & Cornelius. Sexual Hlara.snscnt in the B5orA.
place. The Equal Lmplosment Opponruntr Commission: ,e Guide/ines. 26 Sr. Ltuis U L J. 39.
58 (198 1); Note. Kyras v. Western Elec. Co: Damages/or Se.xual Ilarasment and State 7-art
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damages recoverable under Title VII. The remedies available under
Title VII include an injunction, reinstatement or hiring, back pay. and
attorney's fees.' An award of punitive or compensatory damages is
not allowed.7: The growing concern for adequate recovery for victims
of sexual harassment is further outlined in Section III-D.
C. Necessary Proof Under Title VII
Some knowledge of the court requirements regarding the allocation
of the burden of proof to plaintiffs and defendants in Title VII sexual
harassment cases is necessary before any analysis of those harassment
cases can be made.
Generally. under Title VII the plaintiff shoulders the initial burden
of proof. The plaintiff must prove "by a preponderance of the evidence
that she applied for an available position for which she was qualified.
but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of
unlawful discrimination.' 7- Such proof gives rise to aprinafacie case
of sexual harassment under Title VII. A presumption is created that
the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee.74 The
burden then shifts to the defendant to submit evidence to rebut this
presumption." Defendant sufficiently rebuts this presumption when he
or she -raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated
against the plaintift" ' by submitting a legitimate. nondiscriminatory
reason explaining his or her conduct." If the defendant rebuts the pre-
sumption of discrimination, plaintiff must -demonstrate that the prof-
fered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision. "'
Nevertheless. the standard for aprinafaice case under Title VII is
flexible."" The United States Supreme Court has noted that -It]he facts
necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specifications above of
the prinafacie proof required from respondent is not necessarily appli-
l.a... III (AP L; L Ri v 657. 662-66 11981) 1hereinafter cited as lamages/or Sexual/laras.irnlJI.
omnient..Yetua/ Ilarartmeni: .4 Jurisprudenual.4nalist. 10 CAP. U.L. R.v. 607. 609 (1911.
71 Civil Rights Act of 1964. § 706. 42 U.S.C. § 200.)-5g) 11970). as amended bi 42 U.S (
§ 2tX)3.5gI (Supp. V I .1),
72 Vee Read v Memphis Publishing Co.. 369 F. Supp. 684. 690 (D.C. Tenn. 1973. aJ'drm
part onoh earg Iound; andreid in part on other grounds. 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975). cert. dented
429 U S 9 (1976) (where the district court stated that for a violation of Title Vii. the monetary
award is not punitive, but equitable in nature and intended to restore plaintiff to the rightful
economic position absent the effects of discrimination).
73 Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine. 450 U.S. 248. 253 (1983) (footnote omit-
ted)..Vee ahi McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 411 U.S. 792. 802-03 (1973).
74 450 U S. at 254.
75 Id
76 Id at 254.-5 ifootnote omitted).
77 See id it 255.
79 Id at 256
79 Id t 253 ni
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cable in every respect to differing factual situations."80
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Bundi" i: Jack-
son applied the standard for aprimafacie case under Title VII to a
'differing factual situation" of sexual harassment."' The Bundi" court
explained 'the plaintiff must show (1) that she was a victim of a pattern
or practice of sexual harassment attributable to her employer . . . and
(2) that she applied for and was denied a promotion for which she was
technically eligible and of which she had a reasonable expectation.'"
The standard articulated above applied to the specific factual situation
in Bundr. the standard may still differ under another type of sexual
harassment. Other standards are reviewed below in section III-B.
111. PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW
A majority of the jurisdictions presented with sexual harassment
cases recognize a sex discrimination claim under Title VII.83 However.
the' do not agree on what constitutes sexual harassment 4 or the extent
of employer liability." Furthermore. once a sexual harassment claim is
recognized. damages are limited to the remedies available under Title
VI." A general overview of the case law is set forth below to serve
two purposes: to provide a general understanding of the types of sexual
harassment cases currently litigated, and to focus attention on the three
areas where Title VII does not provide adequate and complete relief.
A. Sexuall' Harassing Acts
In Fletcher '. Greiner.7 plaintiff asserted that the defendant, her em-
ployer. had violated her rights under Title VII and New York's Human
Rights Law"8 by making submission to sexual intercourse a condition
of employment. The New York Supreme Court stated that if plaintiff's
allegations were true, she had stated a good cause of action pursuant to
N) Mcl)onnell DouglaS Corp '. Green. 411 U.S. 792. 812 n.13 119731)
SI See Bundv %. Jack-Ain. (41 F.2d 934, 951 (D.C. Cit. 19811).
82 Id at 953 The court indicated that the remaining allocation of hurdens of prool tc-
mained the %ame, Id
83 Vee Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co.. 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1977); licclan
John,-%Manvalle Corp. 451 F. Supp 1382 (D. Colo. 1971): Kvriazi v. Western Elec Co. 461 1'.
Supp X94 i.N J. 1971). EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp.. 507 F Supp. 599 (S.D).N.Y. 19811: Garber
v. Saxon Busine.s Prods. 552 F 2d 1033 (4th Cir. 1977): Barnes v. Cobtle. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. ('ir
19711. Tomkin v. Public Serv. ELhc. & Gas Co.. 56 F.2d 1044 (3d Citr. 1977). Morgan v. liert.
Corp. 542 F. Supp. 123 (W ). Tenn. 19811. Henson v. City of Dundee. 682 F 2d 897 ( 1th Cir.
19e2p$4 See rnflra noteh, 87-135 and accompanying text.
$5 See" Ili- notes 136-209 and accompanying text.
86 See ifra notes 210-17 and accompanying text.
M7 11 6 isc 2d 564. 435 N Y.S 2d 1005 (19901. Plaintiff aio alleged the tort claim of ahu-
nisc discharge Id at 565-66. 435 N.Y.S.2d at IX)6.
8K See N Y ,xi ( LAW § 296 lMcKinney 19M21.
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New York's Human Rights Law and Title VII. 9 The court deter-
mined, however, that the facts did not support a claim of sex discrimi-
nation and sexual harassment. 90 A review of the papers indicated that
plaintiff and defendant were actually lovers for several years and had
contemplated a future life together.9 t The court emphasized that a sex-
ual harassment claim would not lie unless the sexual suggestions were
unwelcome and rejected.92 The court refused to consider the less obvi-
ous sexually harassing type of conduct here. Plaintiff stated that she
decided to end a mutual and intimate relationship with the defendant.
The defendant terminated their employment relationship.93 In effect.
plaintiff claimed that based upon her refusal to have sexual relations
with defendant, adverse employment consequences resulted. The court
responded by suggesting that initially plaintiff had the choice whether
to submit to sexual relations. Once plaintiff submitted to sexual rela-
tions, she no longer had the right to assert a future sexual harassment
claim.
In 1981 the North Dakota District Court in Walter x" KFGO Radio
held that plaintiff, an employee at the radio station, failed to prove her
sexual harassment claim under Title VII. 4 The court did, however, rec-
ognize that a cause of action based on sexual harassment existed under
Title VII." 5 Plaintiff claimed that she was sexually harassed by her
supervisor when he patted her on the bottom, touched her breast area.
and proositioned an affair while they were attending a business con-
vention. I The court responded by explaining that even if all these acts
occurred, they did not rise to the level of sexual harassment under Title
VII because they were not a "term or condition" of employment, nor
did they create "an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environ-
ment."'" The court failed to explain what types of acts or conduct
would constitute sexual harassment. But the court mentioned that
plaintiff received a raise in 1976, loved her job, and seized this opportu-
nity to be reinstated after her position had been abolished.9" With this
evidence and applying the "totality of the circumstances" test, the court
concluded that plaintifrs position was not retaliatorily abolished and
89. Id at 567-71. 435 N.Y.S.2d at 1008-09. The court states the allegations in the plaintiffs
complaint and then explains: "if true, they are violative of the public policy of this state . . .
which . prohibits discrimination because of sex." Id at 567. 435 N.Y.S.2d at 1008.
90. Id at 568-69. 435 N.Y.S.2d at 1008.
91. Id at 565-68. 435 N.Y.S.2d at 1006-08.
92. Id at 571. 435 N.Y.S.2d at 1010.
93. See id at 565. 435 N.Y.S.2d at I006-07.
94. 518 F. Supp. 1309 (D.N.D. 1981).
95. Id at 1315.
96. Id at 1314.
97. Id at 1314-16. The court cited the EEOC's guidelines on sexual harassment and stated
that "they are entitled to great deference." Id at 1315 (citations omitted).
98. id at 1312. 1315-16.
15
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her claim of discrimination via sexual harassment was "untenable.
The District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. in Munford
s,. James T Barnes A Compan. t° upheld plaintiffs claim of sex dis-
crimination in violation of Title VII. Plaintiff, a female employee.
charged her male supervisor and their employer with sexual harass-
ment because her supervisor consistently made sexual suggestions.""
Plaintiff's supervisor informed her that her job might depend upon
whether she complied with his advances. When plaintiff refused and
threatened to report him to his supervisor, he claimed that she would
be fired.'" 2 Plaintiffs supervisor demanded that she accompany him on
a business trip and have sexual intercourse with him; plaintiff refused
and she was fired.' °3 The Munford court revealed that "sex discrimina-
tion is not limited to sexual stereotyping and that the Act [Title VIII
prohibits any impediment to employment which affects one gender but
not the other."'' According to the Vunford court's rationale. sexual
suggestions are not sexually harassing if made to both genders. There-
fore. the plaintiff in Munford would have been denied relief if the same
supervisor had made sexual suggestions toward a male employee.
Krriazi v Western Electric Compan;,' was the first case in which a
court found sex discrimination in violation of Title VII where the em-
ployee was sexually harassed by co-workers. Kyriazi. a female em-
ployee of Western Electric. charged her employer with sex
discrimination when she was fired in retaliation for lodging a com-
plaint that her male co-workers sexually harassed her."' In Krriai the
sexual harassment included verbal sexual abuse, physical blocking of
her path while working in the office, and placing obscene cartoons on
her desk." 7 The New Jersey District Court, in Krriazi. recognized de-
rogatory, embarrassing, and hostile acts as constituting sexual harass-
ment. Three years later in Guette r. Stauffer Chemical Conpanqr.".
the same court recognized a cause of action against defendant Staulrer
Chemical Company based upon plaintiffs sexual harassment claims of
physical endangerment and verbal abuse. Arguably, these two cases
99. Id at 1316. Plaintiff also alleged claims based on age discrimination and %cx distriminai.
tion because of unequal pay: both of these claims were also dismissed. Id at 1318.
100. 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1977). The trial court had denied the defendant's motion
for summary judgment and the district court affirmed this decision.
101. Id at 460.
102. Id. When plaintiff did report her supcrvisor to his supervisor. he told her that he sup-
ported her supervisor and that she would not be reinstated. Id
103. 441 F. Supp. at 460.
104. Id at 465.
105. 461 F. Supp. 894 (D.N.J. 1978).
106. Id at 899.
107. Id at 934. Kyriazi also involved other claims such as tortious interference with employ.
ment contract and conspiracy to harass in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
108. 518 F. Supp. 521 (D.N.J. 19811.
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show that the New Jersey District Court will recognize derogatory acts
directed at one's sex as sexual harassment. Although this issue has
been resolved in New Jersey. other state and federal courts are not
bound by New Jersey law and many have not judicially addressed this
issue.
EEOC v. Sage Realty Corporation 'o involved another issue related
to the type of acts that constitute sexual harassment. Plaintiff, a female
employed as a lobby attendant in an office building, was required to
wear a sexually revealing uniform. Because of the revealing uniform.
she was subjected to verbal sexual harassment by the public." The
employer knew she was sexually harassed because of the uniform.
Nevertheless, plaintiff's refusal to wear the uniform resulted in her dis-
charge."' The District Court for the Southern District of New York
stated that plaintiff had established aprirnafacie case of sex discrimina-
tion by showing that she was required to wear the uniform as a condi-
tion of employment, the condition was imposed by the employer, and
plaintiff was required to wear the uniform because she was a woman." 2
The court concluded that the uniform requirement, which subjected
her to sexual harassment, constituted sex discrimination under Title
VII if the employer did not have any legitimate and nondiscriminatory
reason for the requirement." 3
Two points become apparent when reviewing Sage Realty. First. a
federal court in New York held that verbal abuse by itself constituted
sexual harassment. Second, an employer may be held liable for the
sexually harassing acts of nonemployees. This second point will be
addressed in section III-B of this article.
A holding similar to Sage Realty was rendered in Morgan Y. Hert:
Corporation. " The District Court for the Western District of Tennes-
see held that sexual questions and remarks directed toward female em-
ployees constituted sexual harassment and thus violated Title VII.'
Plaintiffs, female rental representatives at Hertz, claimed they were de-
nied promotions and supervisors subjected them to verbal sexual har-
assment consisting of "suggestive and indecent comments and direct
109. 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D. N.Y. 1981).
110 Id at 605. The sexual harassment included sexual propositions and indecent comments
and gestures.
I 1. Id at 605-07.
112. Id at 607-08.
113. Id at 611. The court also noted that wearing the sexually revealing uniform did not fall
under Title vn's exception in being a "bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ). Id The
BFOQ exception states that 'it shall not be unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire
and employ employees . . . on the basis of. . . sex . . . in those instances where sex . . . is a
xonafide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particu-
lar business or enterprise . . . . - Civil Rights Act of 1964. § 703. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
114. '542 F Supp. 123 (W.D. Tenn. 1981).
115. Id
17
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questions of a sexual nature."" 6 Although it was unclear whether
higher management knew of this sexual harassment, the court noted
that despite some of the women participating in the sexual comments
"'plaintjs did not appreciate the remarks and that many of the other wo-
men didnot either. "" 7 The court concluded by enjoining the employer
and its employees from continuing this verbal sexual harassment., 1'
Thus, this Tennessee federal court recognized sexual harassment in the
form of an offensive, uncomfortable, and demeaning working
environment.
In Tomkins v Public Service Electric & Gas Company" l the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld plaintiff's sexual harassment
claim, but indirectly limited the types of conduct recognized as sexual
harassment. The Tomkins court failed to consider or recognize the of-
fensive environment type of sexual harassment recognized in Morgan
and Sage Realty by concluding that a violation of Title VII occurs
when:
a supervisor, with the actual or constructive knowledge of the em-
ployer, makes sexual advances or demands toward subordinate em-
ployees and conditions that employee's job status--evaluation.
continued employment, promotion, or other aspects of career develop-
ment----on a favorable response to those advances or demands, and the
employer does not take prompt and appropriate remedial action after
acquiring such knowledge.120
Although the above statement recognized that some acts constitute sex-
ual harassment, the court did not consider other less obvious acts or
conduct that would constitute sexual harassment.
Despite being one of the earlier sexual harassment cases, Barnes r.
Co.rtle'2 ' involved similar issues. In Barnes the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld plaintiff's complaint alleg-
ing that her supervisor's conduct violated the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Act of 1972.2 Barnes involved a female employee
(appellant) at the Environmental Protection Agency whose supervisor
repeatedly made sexual advances toward her.'2 Appellant's supervisor
(appellee), a male director of the Agency, continually asked her if she
would join him after work, made sexual comments, and suggested that
1l6 Id at 125.
117 Id at 128 (emphasis in original).
118. Id The court also found that Hertz engaged in sex discrimination by failing to promote
women and ordered a new hearing conducted by a magistrate to determine the extent of monetary
damages to be awarded plaintiffs for defendants' discriminatory acts. Id at 128-29.
119. 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
120 Id at 1048-49.
121. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
122. Id at 984. (The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 extended Title ViI protec-
tion to federal cmployers.)
123. Id at 984-85.
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her employment status would rise if she would have an affair with
him. 2' After appel.ant's repeated refusals, the director and others at
the agency belittled and harassed her. They took away her job duties.
which ultimately led to the retaliatory abolition of appellant's job.'2 "
Appellant argued that retention of her job depended upon submis-
sion to her supervisor's sexual advances, a condition the director did
not enforce upon males.' 26 The court agreed, observing that "[but for
her womanhood, from aught that appears, her participation in sexual
activity would never have been solicited."' 2 The court also explained
that sexual activity was solicited only because appellant was a woman
in a subordinate position to her supervisor and stated that she "was
asked to bow to his demands as a price of holding her job." ' The
employee's gender was important because the director did not make
any sexual demands on male employees. The fact that gender was in-
volved in a discriminatory practice. however, is not dispositive. For a
successful case of sex discrimination in employment, it is sufficient that
gender contributed to the discriminatory practice in a "substantial
way."' 2' The court observed that appellant's job was conditional upon
two factors: her gender and her cooperation in her employer's sexual
demands.' 3
The court also emphasized that Title VII should protect one em-
ployee even if other employees of the same gender are not confronted
with sexual demands by the same supervisor.' 3 ' The court maintained
that "ft]he protections afforded by Title VII against sex discrimination
are extended to the individual and a 'single instance of discrimination
may form the basis of a private suit.' ,.,32 The court concluded that the
protection of Title VII undoubtedly included the discriminatory prac-
tice of this case.13 3
Barnes is similar to Morgan, KYriazi, Sage Realty, Tomkins and
Gur'efie because the sexually harassing acts included a demeaning, be-
littling work environment. Although other sexually harassing acts were
124. Id at 985.
125. Id (footnote omitted).
126. Id at 989. Plaintiff had initially attempted to solve this matter informally and then she
filed a formal complaint with an appeals examiner. Id at 985. She later obtained an attorney and
appealed to the Civil Service Commission. When her out-.of-coun attempts were to no avail, she
filed her case in district court. Id at 986.
127. Id at 990.
128. Id
129. Id (footnote omitted).
130. Id at 992.
131. Id at 993-94. When concluding that single discriminatory incident may give rise to a
lawsuit, the Bamres court reviewed racial and other sex discrimination cases to support its holding.
132. Id at 993 (footnote omitted) (quoting King v. Laborers in'tl Union. 443 F.2d 273. 278
(6th Cir. 1971)).
133. Id at 995 (footnote omitted).
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involved, the Barnes court considered the belittling work atmosphere
as constituting sexual harassment. The court did not, however, deter-
mine whether this type of conduct alone would constitute sexual
harassment.
Like Munford. Barnes suggested that if the sexually harassing acts
were also directed toward a male employee, neither the female nor the
male employee would be able to-recover under Title VII. This type of
rationale is based upon the language of Title VII: discriminatory acts
must be based upon sex in order to be against the law.
Nevertheless, the Barnes court did consider the situation where just
one employee was harassed by a single sexually harassing act. The
court acknowledged two types of situations. First, the sexual harass-
ment of one employee was sufficient in order to state a recognizable
claim. Second, a single act may constitute sexual harassment. One
court has ruled directly contrary to the Barnes holding. In illiants r
Sa.vbe"' 4 the District Court for the District of Columbia held that a
plaintiff must allege in her complaint that the sexual harassment was
imposed on women in the same situation as plaintiff and not just one
isolated incident. 13  This holding was particularly perplexing because
Barnes and Williams were rendered in the same jurisdiction. Barnes by
an appellate court and Williams by a trial court. Nevertheless, this lack
of uniformity within a jurisdiction reveals the need for legislative
direction.
Legislative direction is needed to establish an exhaustive definition
of what types of acts and conduct constitute sexual harassment. Be-
cause Title VII and the EEOC's guidelines have left many questions
unanswered concerning which acts constitute sexual harassment, judi-
cial determinations are inconsistent.
B. Limited Employer Liability
In 1975 an unsuccessful attempt to recognize legal remedies for on
the job sexual harassment was made in Corne v. Bausch and Lomb.
Inc. "" The plaintiffs in Come were two female employees who were
subjected to verbal and physical sexual advances by their male supervi-
sor."" When the sexual advances continued, the women quit. The
plaintiffs argued that the employer, Bausch and Lomb, was responsible
134 413 1 Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976).rerad& remandedon other grounds sub nom. Williams v
clI. 5.(7 F 2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). decision on remand sub. nom. Williams v. Civiletti. 487 F.
Supp 1387 D D.C. 1980).
135 Id at 660 n.8. The court stated that only policies and practices of the employer, and not
"interpcrsonal disputes between employees." arc violations under Title Vii. Id. at 640-61.
136. 390 F Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975). vacated and remanded. No. 75-1857 (9th Car. July 28.
1977)
137. Although the court failed to mention the actual types of mexual advances, it did state that
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because its administrative personnel knew or should have known of the
supervisor's sexual advances toward them.t38 The Arizona District
Court failed to state expressly whether the employer, in fact, had
knowledge of the supervisor's conduct. Apparently, the court consid-
ered this issue irrelevant.
Plaintiffs claimed that their supervisor's conduct violated Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act because it constituted a condition of employment
that discriminated on the basis of sex. 39 The court rejected this argu-
ment by stating that an unlawful employment practice can be discrimi-
nation only if initiated by the employer. 4 The court also interpreted
Title VII as excluding the supervisor's conduct because it was not re-
lated to the nature of the employment and no employer policy existed
condoning this type of conduct. 4 ' The court considered it "ludicrous"
to hold the supervisor's conduct illegal under Title VII because there
would be no basis for a lawsuit if the supervisor had also made sexual
advances toward men. 4"2
The Come holding was significant for several reasons. First, it was
the only case holding that employers are not liable under Title VII for
the sexually harassing acts of their supervisors. According to Come.
sexually harassed employees may bring suit under Title VII only when
they are harassed by the employer. Second, the court found no em-
ployer liability because the same supervisor could have sexually
harassed men. Although a possibility, the supervisor had, in fact, only
sexually harassed women. The Come court's determination that no ba-
sis for a lawsuit existed because the supervisor may sexually harass
both male and female employees is particularly disturbing in light of
the Munford and Barnes holdings which require that sexual harassment
be directed toward only one sex. Based on Come, legal remedies for on
the job sexual harassment would never be provided under Title VII.
Third, the Come court required the existence of an employer policy
condoning sexual harassment. Finding such policy would be rare. De-
termining that an employer policy condoning sexual harassment ex-
isted by virtue of the fact that the employer did not investigate sexual
harassment complaints would be a more reasonable condition, albeit
the plaintiffs alleged "the male superior persistently takes unsolicited and unwelcome sexual liber-
ties with the female employees. Id at 162.
138. Id at 162-63.
139. Id at 162.
140. Apparently. the court decided not to rely upon the definition of "employer" under Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act which tncludes any agent of the employer. See 42 U.S.C.
2000e(b) (1976).
141. 390 F. Supp. at 163.
142. The judge in Coane also pointed out the supervisor's conduct was "nothing more than a
personal proclivity" and that to allow this lawsuit under Title VII would give rise to a "federal
lawsuit cvcrytime any employee made amorous or sexual oriented advances toward another." Id
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not one required by Title VII. This issue may also be viewed from a
different angle.
In a terse opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit upheld plaintif's claim of a Title VII violation in Garber r.
Saxon Business Products. "I' By alleging in her complaint that her em-
ployer's policy condoned the supervisor's practice of sexually harassing
female employees, plaintiff made out a good cause of action.' The
court reversed the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint.
which claimed that she was fired for refusing her supervisor's sexual
advances. 43 What is sufficient to prevent dismissal of a sexual harass-
ment claim in the fourth circuit need not even be proved in Colorado.
The Colorado District Court in Heelan P. Johns-Manrille Corpora-
tion "4 ruled that the plaintiff did not have to prove that the employer
condoned a policy of sexual harassment. To require this proof, the
court said, would be giving relief in one hand while taking relief away
with the other. 4 " This type of proof is not required in any other area of
employment discrimination. 48
The Heelan case involved another disputed issue in the jurisdictions:
whether internal company procedures must be exhausted before an em-
ployer may be held liable. The facts of Heelan involved a plaintiff
whose supervisor repeatedly made sexual advances toward her for ap-
proximately two years.'49 Despite her excellent work performance rec-
ord and top management knowledge of her complaints of sexual
harassment, plaintiff was fired after refusing to have an affair with her
supervisor.'3 If the employer has a policy of discouraging sexual har-
assment and a grievance department to receive complaints, the em-
ployer may not be held liable if the employee failed to take advantage
of this procedure according to the Heelan court.'"' This was not, how-
ever, the situation in the Heelan case.
A similar holding was rendered by the District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan in Munford v. lames T Barnes & Compan." 2
The Munford court stressed that an employer has an affirmative duty to
investigate and remedy complaints of sexual harassment. The em-
ployer may be liable for the conduct of supervisors if it fails to investi-
143. 552 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir. 1977).
144. Id
145. Id
146. 451 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Colo. 1978).
147. Id at 1389.
148. Id
149. Id at 1387.
150. Id at 1385-87.
151. Id at 1389.
152. 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 19771.
22
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 [1983], Art. 10
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol14/iss1/10
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
gate.' 3 Both cases, however, leave some questions unanswered. What
if the employer does not have a grievance procedure? What, then, is
the extent of employer liability?
The holdings of the trial and appellate courts in Miller ;. Bank of
,4merica'5 ' added to the confusion in this area. The trial court in
Miller rejected plaintiff's claim of sexual harassment.'" Miller, a fe-
male employee, alleged that her male supervisor promised a better job
if she would be sexually cooperative. 5 6 She refused to comply with his
sexual advances and, as a result, was dismissed. The Miller court first
considered the Bank of America's policy of preventing and prohibiting
moral misconduct; a policy which included prohibiting sexual ad-
vances. " According to the court, Miller's claim must fail because she
did not file her complaint with the Bank's Employer Relations Depart-
ment.'" The Bank had no knowledge of the situation and was not
given an opportunity to investigate and remedy the situation. The
court observed that the employer cannot be held liable if the employee
failed to exhaust the company's remedies.1'5
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower courl
decision and remanded the case with instructions for the lower court.""
The court emphasized that an employer was liable for the acts of a
supervisor even if the supervisor's actions had violated company pol-
icy.' 6 ' The court also stressed that exhausting the company's internal
remedies was not a prerequisite to filing a suit under Title VII.' 2 Al-
though settled in the ninth circuit, this issue is muddled in other juris-
dictions. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in Barnes stated that an employer may not be
liable under Title VII. If the employer has a policy prohibiting dis-
criminatory practices and a supervisor disobeys the policy without the
employer's knowledge, the employer will be given an opportunity to
remedy the situation when discovered. 63
Barnes also considered the related issue of whether the employer
153 Id at 466.
154 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976). rev d and remanded. 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
155 418 F. Supp. at 233.
156. Id at 234.
157. Id at 235.
158. The Miller court, like the Corne court, was reluctant to hold the employer liable for
"isolated and unauthorized sex misconduct" of which he or she had no knowledge. Id at 234.
159. Id at 235-34. Although the court stated that exhausting company remedies is not a pre-
requisite to recovery under Title VII. its decision appeared to suggest otherwise. Id at 236 n.2.
160. Miller v. Bank of America. 600 F.2d 211. 214 (9th Cir. 1979).
161. Id at 213.
162. Id at 214. The court did note. however, that a lawsuit could be avoided if a company
remedies the situation by working with the EEOC when initially contacted by them during their
"conciliation pcnod.'" Id.
163. 561 F.2d 983. 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (footnote omitted).
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must have knowledge of the sexually harassing acts of supervisors
before it may be held liable. The various jurisdictions have ruled dif-
ferently regarding employer knowledge. In Walter r. KFGO Radio the
North Dakota District Court acknowledged that the supervisor's pats
on plaintiffs buttock were embarrassing but denied recovery because
plaintiff never expressed her discomfort to her employer.' The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Tomkins v.
Public Ser'ice Electric & Gas C(ompan;" held that an employer must
have actual or constructive knowledge of the supervisor's sexual har-
assment before liability is found. t"'
In Henson Y. Ci of Dundee the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit made a distinction between claims in sexual har-
assment cases that allege an offensive working environment and those
that allege loss of a tangible job benefit when considering the require-
ment of employer knowledge.' t " Where the sexual harassment results
in an offensive and hostile working environment, the court held that
the employer must know or should have known of this harassment. "'
On the other hand. where the sexual harassment resulted in the em-
ployee's loss of a tangible job benefit, the employer is strictly liable if
this loss was caused by a supervisor.6"' The court justified this distinc-
tion by explaining that when a supervisor creates an offensive and hos-
tile working environment, the supervisor is acting outside the scope of
employment authority. However. when the supervisor causes the em-
ployee's loss of a tangible job benefit, then the supervisor is acting
within the scope of employment authority and the employer would be
liable. "9 The justification for this distinction appears to be neither le-
gally nor logically sound.
Employer liability for sexual harassment by co-workers has also
given rise to different standards. In Gui'ette v. Stan/ fr Chemical Coln-
panr the New Jersey District Court leld that a nonsupervisory em-
164 581 F Supp. 1309. 1316 (1) N.I). 1981)
165 568 F 2d 1044. 1048-49 (3d Cir 1977) 'o;m.41n Insol'cd a female emnployee it the Pubi
Service Electric & Gas Co. who was sxuall. harassed by her supcrvasor during a discussion ( .cr
lunch) concerning her upcoming evaluation and possible promotion. Ier supervisor said it ,ould
be nccecsars, to have sexual relations with him if they were to have a satisfactory working relation-
ship. and as Tomktns attempted to leave the restaurant, he physicallN restrained her. Although
she claimcd that her employer knew or should have known of this incdent. Tomkin., was eventu.
ally fired in retaliation for refusal of her Supervisor's sexual advances. Before she was tired. he
had been transferred to an inferior position and harassed by other employees. She suffered phyi-
cal and emotional distress which caused her to be absent from work on scsral occasions. Id at
1044-46.
166 682 F 2d $97.905 & n.10. 909-10(11th Cir. 1982). The facts ofilenson will be discusscd
infra text accompanying notes 186-190.
167. Id at 905.
168. Id. at 909
169 Id at 910.
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ployee may not be held liable for sexual harassment under Title VII.'""
The court did not explain whether it meant that a nonsupervisory em-
ployee may not be personally liable or whether the employer may not
be held liable for the sexually harassing acts of nonsupervisory employ-
ees. The same court, three years earlier in Kyriazi, had determined that
an employzer may be found liable for the sexually harassing acts of co-
workers.' ' The Kriazi court, however, found that Kyriazi's supervi-
sors were aware of the sexual harassment but refused to investigate her
complaint.' 2 In Guyette supervisors were involved in the sexually
harassing acts. The Guveite court failed to state whether other higher
ranked supervisors had knowledge and whether this would have af-
fected employer liability for a co-worker's sexual harassment.
In Sage Realty a New York federal court held the employer liable
for the sexually harassing acts of the public."" The employer knew
that plaintiff was harassed because his policy required that the plaintiff
wear a sexually revealing uniform.'74 The vague holdings set forth in
Gurette. Krriazi. and Sage Real ' do not give a clear answer concern-
ing an employer' liability for the sexually harassing acts of co-workers
and nonemployees. They do not resolve the issue of employer knowl-
edge either.
Another recently litigated issue concerning employer liability is
whether the sexually harassed employee must be deprived of a tangible
job benefit (i.e.. retaliatory dismissal, demotion, or promotion) in order
to have a successful claim under Title VII. Bundy' v. Jackson 17. was the
first case where this issue arose. Plaintiff Bundy's initial experience
with sexual harassment began in 1972 when a co-employee, now direc-
tor of Department of Corrections, sexually propositioned her.'7" Two
years later she received sexual propositions from two other supervi-
sors.' 77 Bundy complained of these sexual advances to her supervisor's
supervisor, who responded that "any man in his right mind would want
to rape you" "and he proceeded to sexually proposition Bundy. 17x
Bundy argued that her refusal of several supervisors' unsolicited sex-
ual advances resulted in those supervisors denying her promotions to
170 51 F Supp 521. 526 (D.N.J. 1981).
171 461 F Supp. X94. 894 [D.N.J. 1978).
112. Id at 935-36.
173. 507 F. Supp. 599. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
174. Id at 605-07.
175. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 19811.
176. Id at 939.
177. Id at 939-40. Most of the sexual harassment included propositions to engage in sexual
intercourse and intimate sexual questions. After Bundy complained, one supervisor *'began io
derogate her for alleged malingenng and poor work performance. though she had not previously
received any such crincism." Id at 940.
178 Id
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which she was entitled." 9 In a novel approach, Bundy contended that
her employer violated Title VII by allowing female employees to be
subjected to sexual harassment even though the employees' refusal of
sexual advances did not result in a deprivation of tangible job bene-
fit.'8 ° Although appellant also requested declaratory and injunctive re-
lief, the lower court refused to grant Bundy any relief reasoning that
sexual harassment in this case does not constitute sex discrimination
pursuant to Title VII. s8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed
the lower court's decision emphasizing that "'sex discrimination within
the meaning of Title VII is not limited to disparate treatment founded
solely or categorically on gender. Rather, discrimination is sex dis-
crimination whenever sex is for no legitimate reason a substantial fac-
tor in the discrimination."'8 2 Reviewing the requirements set forth in
Barnes. the court of appeals determined that Bundy proved that her
employer discriminated against her on the basis of sex.'8 3 The court of
appeals held the sex discrimination violated Title VII because it related
to the "terms. conditions, or privileges of employment," reasoning that
an employer could legally sexually harass an employee as long as the
employee was not dismissed unless the Barnes holding was extended. ' 4
If an employee has proved that she was discriminated against because
of her sex and the discrimination related to "terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment." she can successfully show a Title VII violation
even though there has been no loss of a tangible benefit."'
The Bundy holding was followed by the eleventh circuit in Henson r.
City of Dundee. "6 Plaintiff, a female dispatcher in the Dundee police
department, and a female co-worker were sexually harassed by the
male chief of the police department by his "demeaning sexual inquiries
and vulgarities" and his repeated sexual propositions.' 8" Plaintiff com-
179. Id at 940-41.
180. Id at 943-44. The court noted that there was evidence that Bundy wa, not the only
woman sexually harassed by the same supervsors. Id. at 940.
181. d at 941-42.
182. Id at 942 (emphasis in original).
183. Id at 943. The court stated "'[wle thus readily conclude that Bundy's emplo)cr dscmrii-
nated against her on the basis of sex." d
184. Id at 945.
185. Id at 94346. The court explained that the Title Vii violations involved in flund,' can be
considered as resulting in a "discriminatory work environmen.'" Id. at 943 (emphasis in original).
The court considered racial and ethnic discrimination cases where a "poisoning foil the atmos-
phere of employment" was found to be in violation of Title VII. Id at 94445. The court then
rhetorically asked "Jhlow then can sexual harassment, which injects the most demeaning sexual
stereotypes into the general work environment and which always represents an intentional assault
on an individual's innermost privacy, not be illegal?" Id at 945.
186. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
187. Id at 899. The district court refused to allow the presentation of evidence showing that
the chief of police also made sexual propositions to plaintiff's co-worker. Id
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plained to the City Manager of Dundee. but no remedial action was
taken.'8 1 She claimed that she was constructively discharged because
the sexual harassment "created a hostile and offensive working envi-
ronment for women at the police station." She ultimately resigned
fearing retaliatory dismissal for not complying with the chiefs sexual
demands.' Plaintiff also claimed that the chief prevented her from
entering the police academy because she declined his sexual
propositions."
The district court entered judgment in favor of the city and plaintiff
appealed.' 9 ' The court of appeals reversed part of the lower court's
decision explaining "'that under certain circumstances, the creation of
an offensive or hostile work environment due to sexual harassment can
violate Title VII irrespective of whether the complainant suffers tangi-
ble job detriment."'" 2 The court reviewed race and ethnic discrimina-
tion cases under Title VII and determined that the same principles
applied to sex discrimination cases under Title VII. When sexual har-
assment creates a hostile or offensive working environment, the em-
ployer may be liable under Title VII even if the employee does not lose
a tangible job benefit.'"I Applying Title VII terminology and analysis.
the court stated -[a] pattern of sexual harassment inflicted upon an em-
ployee because of her sex is a pattern of behavior that inflicts disparate
treatment upon a member of one sex with respect to terms, conditions.
or privileges of employment.""
Thus, both the District of Columbia and the eleventh circuit recog-
nized employer liability for a sexual harassment claim under Title VII
despite no loss of a tangible employment benefit. Nevertheless, other
jurisdictions are not bound by these holdings. Although the Bundl' and
Henson courts' reasoning was legally and logically sound and agreed
with the standards set forth in the EEOC's guidelines, the extent of
employer liability under Title VII has not been defined explicitly.
An employer's liability may also be limited by the applicable stan-
dard for aprimafacie case of sexual harassment under Title VII. As
IX8. Id
189. Id at 899.900.
190 Id At 900. Plaintiff presented the testimony of the City Manager that plaintiff was quali-
fled and would have been able to attend the police academy had the chief notified her of plaintlIrs
interest. Id
191. Id at 899.
192. Id at g01. The court of appeals remanded this claim to the lower court. Id
193. Id at 901-02.
194. Id at 902. Nevertheless. the Heason court held that plaintiff sufficiently alleged the nec-
essary elements of her third sexual harassment claim involving the chiefs preventing her entrance
into the police academy. She was entitled to a new tral on this issue. The dismissal of plaintil1's
second sexual harassment claim involving constructive discharge was. however, upheld because
the evidence suggested that she voluntarily quit. Id at 908-13. Appellate courts are reluctant to
overturn a lower court's "findings of fact" unless they are deemed *'clearly erroneous." Id at 907.
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previously set forth in section II-C. the court in Bundi" i" Jackson" .
outlined the necessary elements for a successful sexual harassment
claim. Several other courts have also outlined the elements necessary
for a sexual harassment claim. In Tomkins t, Public Ser-ice Electric c&
Gas Corapany; the court explained that a claimant must establish that
the sexual advances constituted a condition of employment and the em-
ployer imposed this condition because of one's sex for a cognizable
claim under Title VII.*
In Heelan ): Johns-Afanvile Corporation the court maintained that a
successful claim of sexual harassment based upon sex discrimination
prohibited under Title VII "must plead and prove that (1) submission
to sexual advances of supervisor was a term or condition of employ-
ment. (2) that this fact substantially affected plaintilFs employment and
(3) employees of the opposite sex were not affected in the same way by
these actions." '" The court in Henson '. Ciir of DundIee explained that
plaintiff must submit similar proof. The plaintiff must prove that she
belonged to a protected group: she was subject to unwelcome sexual
harassment: the harassment was based on sex: the harassment affected
a "term. condition, or privilege" of employment: and the employer
knew or should have known of the harassment.' The court defined
belonging to a protected group as showing that plaintiff was a woman
and unwelcome sexual harassment as conduct that was unsolicited." "
The court used a "'but for" test to determine if plaintiff was discrimi-
nated against based on sex. "But for" her sex, she would not have been
sexually harassed. -M) Considering this last qualification, however, male
and female employees who are sexually harassed by a bi-sexual super-
visor would not be eligible for recovery under Title Vl1.2 "'
Sexual harassment affects a term, condition or privilege of employ-
ment when it -is sufficiently severe and persistent to affect seriously the
psychological well beings of employees."2 2" Finally, the Henson court
explained that the employer was liable for sexual harassment when it
knew or should have known of the harassment: "constructive knowl-
edge" will suffice for the latter. ' 3 The employer may be absolved of
195. 641 F.2d 934. 953 (D.C O.r. 1981).
196 568 1: 2d 1044. 1046 (3d Car. 1977).
197. 451 F. Supp. 1382. 1389 113. Colo 1978)
198 682 F.2d 897. 903-05 I(th ('ir 1982).
199 Id at 903.
21X) Id at 903-04.
201. Id. at 904. . 'cord Bundy v. Jackson. 641 F.2d 934. 943 & n.7 (1981) (sexual hara.%%ment
would not be sex discrimination where a bisexual 5upen'sor harasses ith radle and female
employees).
202 682 F.2d at 904. This element ofthepnnafarte case is to be determined by the totality of
the circumstances. Id. (citing 20 C. R. § 1604 i 1(b) 11981)).
203. 682 F.2d at 905 (citing Taylor v. Jones. 653 F.2d 1199 (8th Car. 1981)). .'onstructzve
knowledge occurs when the harassment is so pervasive that kno4ledgc as infcrred.
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liability if the employer remedies the situation. "
A review of the standards for aprimafacie case of sexual harassment
articulated by the third. eleventh, and District of Columbia circuits and
the Colorado District Court indicated further inconsistencies among
the jurisdictions. Some require a stronger showing; others require a
weaker showing. Thus. employer liability for sexual harassment claims
will not be uniform among the jurisdictions. Different standards are
being applied to sexual harassment cases based on violations of Title
VII. The courts in pre-and post-Bundi' cases appear understandably
confused regarding whether employer knowledge was required.2 "
whether loss of a tangible employment benefit must result. , whether
an employer can be found liable for co-workers' or customers' sexual
harassment and, if so. under what circumstances and to what extent
would the employer be liable.2t 7 what the plaintiff must prove for a
primafacie case and what the defendant must show to rebut this,'"
and finally, whether plaintiff must exhaust company remedies before
recovering under Title VII."' Based upon the confusion and differing
answers to the above questions among the jurisdictions, the Supreme
Court should decide a Title VII sexual harassment case soon.
C. Inadequate and Incomplete Damages
In several of the cases discussed above, plaintiffs were awarded some
form of damages. Those awards varied from one case to another be-
cause each plaintifrs injury also varied. For example, in EEOC v. Sage
Realir Corporation plaintiff was awarded damages which included
back pay. pension contributions, other employment benefits, and attor-
ney's fees.-"' This award compensated plaintiff for wrongful termina-
tion. The plaintiff in Heelan v. Johns-Manv'ille Corporation was
awarded back pay, lost employment benefits, and attorney's fees for
204. 682 F 2d at 905.
205. See Bundv v. Jackson. 641 F.2d 934. 953 (D.C. Cir t981; Walter v. K:GO Radio. 518
1: Supp. 1309. 1316 1D.N.D. 1981). Barnes v. Costle. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977): Garber v.
Saxon Business Prods. 552. F.2d 1033. 1033 (4th Cir. 1977).
206. .e,' Bundv v. Jackson. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981): Ilenson v. City of Dundee. 682
F.2d X97. 901 (1tl Cir. 1982).
207. See K)riazi v. Western Elec. Co.. 461 F. Supp. X(94. 941 (D.N.J. 1978). EEOC v. Sage
Realty Corp. 507 F. Supp. 599. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1981; Williams v. Saxbc. 413 F. Supp. 654. 659
ID D.C. 1976): Guyette v. Stauffer Chem. Co.. 418 F. Supp. 521. 526 (D.N.J. 1981).
208. See Bundy v Jackson. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981): Tomkins v. Public Serv. Ecc. &
(;as Co.. 568 F.2d 1044. 1048-49 (3d Cir. 19771. leclan v. Johns-Manvlle Corp.. 451 F. Supp.
1382. 1389 ID. Colo. 1978).
209. See Miller v. Bank of America. 600 F.2d 211. 214 (9th Cur. 1979). Munford v. James T.
Barnes & Co.. 441 F. Supp. 459. 466 (E.D. Mich. 1979): Heelan v. Johns Manville Corp.. 451 F.
Supp. 1382. 1389 (D. Colo. 1978).
210. 507 F. Supp. 599. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Plaintfl's award amounted to $33.141.75 which
included ,ntcrest. Id
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wrongful dismissal. 2" In K;'riazi v. Western Electric C(ompan;' plaintiff
was awarded injunctive relief, back pay, and attorney's fees for being
fired after Western Electric discovered that a sex discrimination claim
had been filed.23 2 The court in Morgan v. Hertz Corporation issued an
injunction enjoining the employer, Hertz, and its employees, from con-
tinuing the verbal sexual harassment.2 3  In Williams V. Saxbe plaintiff
did not include a request for specific relief so the court ordered the
parties to submit memoranda on this issue.214 In Bund; v. Jackson the
court of appeals remanded the case to the lower court to determine
appropriate injunctive relief and to conduct evidentiary hearings con-
cerning Bundy's claims of back pay and lost promotions. 2-
Most of the damage awards above address the injury that resulted
from the discrimination. It is questionable, however, whether plaintiffs
were compensated fully for the harm done. Although monetary awards
for back pay, lost employment benefits, and attorney's fees cover some
of the money lost or spent vindicating the sexually harassed victims'
rights, additional costs are borne by the victim. Such costs might in-
volve seeking other employment, psychological help, as well as other
medical assistance. Although the need for compensatory damages is
discussed later. a related question. however, involves whether Title VII
damages adequately remedy the types of sexual harassment presented
in the above cases.
In Morgan an injunction was issued prohibiting the employer and
employees from verbally sexually harassing other employees. The ef-
fectiveness of this form of remedy is questionable. It is suggested that
plaintiffs and defendants are not usually the "best of friends" after a
lawsuit. But rather, after the termination of a lawsuit, plaintiffs and
defendants express hostility toward one another, or at least, the "loser"
is hostile toward the "'winner." This type of employment atmosphere
would seem to facilitate verbal abuse or possibly some other retaliatory
action. Perhaps a monetary award would be better suited to this situa-
tion. Monetary damages consisting of back pay awarded to plaintiff
until other employment is secured would offer a complete and ade-
quate remedy.
Monetary damages might also address a situation where compensa-
tion for injury is difficult to imagine. For instance, in Guyette t. Staqf-
211 451 F. Supp. 1382. 1391 ID. Colo. 1978).
212. 461 F Supp. 894. 950 (D.N.J. 1978).
213 542 : Supp. 123. 128 (W.D. Tenn. 1981). The court also found that Ilcrtz engaged in %cx
dIral annation b, failing to promote women and ordered a new hearing to determine the extent of
monetary damages to be awarded plaintiffs. Id. at 128-29.
214. 413 F Supp. 654. 663 (D.D.C. 1976).rev'd and remanded on othergroundr jub nor. Wil-
him% v Bell. 5X47 F.2d 1240 (D C. Cir. 1978). dectrton on remandsub nor. Williams v. Cvilctti.
487 P Supp. 1387 (D.D C. 1980).
215 t4I F:.2d 934. 950 (DC. Car 1981).
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fer Chemical Compan; plaintiffs were physically endangered when
defendants placed hazardous chemicals in the plants above their
desks.' Plaintiffs' work product was also stolen or ruined.2- 7 In this
situation, an injunction preventing future harassment would fail to ad-
dress the harm already done. Although a monetary award could not
adequately compensate plaintiffs for the physical endangerment and
ruined work product, it could give them an opportunity to secure em-
ployment elsewhere by covering transitory expenses.
Compensation for sexual harassment victims should conform to the
realities of the situation. It may be unreasonable to expect a sexually
harassed victim to return to a job at which she or he experienced sexual
harassment. Title VII remedies are limited because they are not adapt-
able to the needs of sexually harassed victims.
D. Problems with Recovery under Title VII
I. Title VII as an Incomplete Remedy
In line with the court's apparent confusion over an employee's recov-
ery for sexual harassment under Title VII. several commentators have
expressed their dissatisfaction with either all or part of Title VII statu-
tory requirements for recovery including the EEOC's guidelines inter-
preting Title VII.2"
As the previous discussion of the cases indicated, a major drawback
of initiating a sexual harassment lawsuit under Title VII would be the
limited remedies available. Under Title VII, only reinstatement, lost
employment benefits, back pay, attorney's fees and "equitable relief"
may be awarded. 2 ' Equitable relief includes issuing an injunction or
ordering specific performance.- Most notably. recovery under Title
VII fails to include monetary relief in the form of compensatory and
punitive damages.22' This exclusion of punitive damages appears to
comport with Title VII's underlying purpose "to make persons whole
for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment
216. 518 F Supp 521. 523 (D.N.J. 1981). The court's decision fails to mention whether any
damages were awarded.
217. Id
218. See McLain.supra note 52. at 288-336. Vermuelen..rupra note 32. at 285-94. Note. Ieival
Remediesfor Emplment. Related Serual larasment. 64 MiNN. L. Ri-.v. 151. 153-67 (1979) [here-
mafter cited as Legal Remediesi.
219. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
220. Equitable relief is not the equivalent of an award of money damages. See LEOC v.
Detroit Edison Co.. 515 F.2d 301. 308 (6th Cir. 1975): Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express Inc..
417 F.2d 1122. 1125 (5th Cir. 1969).
221. Henson v. City of Dundee. 682 F.2d 897. 905 011th Cir. 1982): Bundy v. Jacks.on. 641
F.2d 934. 946-47 (D.C. Cir. 1981): EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co.. 515 F.2d 301. 308 (6th Cr. 1975).
Punitive damages are recoverable when Title VII is coupled with a valid § 1981 claim. See Harris
v. Richards Mfg. Co.. Inc.. 675 F.2d 811. 814 (6th Cir. 1982).
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discrimination."222
Punitive damages represent a monetary award to plaintiff above the
amount necessary to compensate fully for his or her injury. 22 Punitive
damages are awarded for the purpose of punishing the wrongdoer, in-
structing the wrongdoer not to repeat the same actions or conduct, and
deterring others from doing the same wrongful acts.2 2 Punitive dam-
ages are usually awarded based upon a defendant's culpable state of
mind:
It is usually the defendant's mental state that is said to justify a punitive
award against him. rather than his outward conduct. Thus courts have
developed a large vocabulary to describe the kind of mental state re-
quired-the defendant must be "malicious." -reckless," "oppressive."
.'evil.'" "wicked." or guilty of -wanton misconduct." or "morally culpa-
ble" conduct. 225
Moreover, Professor Dobbs explained that "'some courts have viewed
punitive damages as compensatory. in the limited sense that they may
provide damages for the wounded feelings of the plaintiff."'22 ' Al-
though some courts will award punitive damages where the defendant
exhibits only extreme conduct, such as conscious or criminal indiffer-
ence to the safety or rights of others, most courts agree that a punitive
damages award is based on the defendant's culpable state of mind.2 2
At least one exception to this general rule must be noted. Several cases
have indicated that where defendant has committed a serious abuse of a
position of pri'ilege or power, punitive damages could be awarded
against a defendant absent the usual requirement of a culpable state of
mind.2: Professor Dobbs provides several examples including insurers
refusing to pay policy coverage, utilities cutting off service, dismissal in
violation of employment contract, and a bank refusing to honor a cus-
tomer's check. 2-9 Professor Dobbs suggests:
Allowance of punitive damages on the basis of this special kind of con-
duct rather than on the basis of the defendant's mental state, would be
entirely consistent with the idea that punitive awards should serve the
purpose of encouraging suit by the plaintiff as a "private attorney gen-
eral" on issues of special importance. All of this gives ground for at
222 Albrmarle Paper Co. v. Moody. 422 U.S. 405. 418 (1975).
223 W. Possf.R. ToRTs § 2. at 9(4th ed. 1971).
224. Id
225 D. DosuS. RF.MFi.S 205 (1973).
226. Id (footnote omitted).
227. Id at 205-06.
228. Id at 206.
229. Id at 206-07 (footnotes omitted). Professor Dobbs explained:
But the pattern of special liability for those who abuse positions of authority and
privilege is a strong one. showing up in a similar group of cases where attornc)s*
fees arc assessed against the defendant, as well as in the substantive tort law con-
cerning mental anguish, and in the substantive law of duress. and unconscionability.
Id at 207 (footnotes omitted).
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least a suspicion that in the abuse-of-power cases. a subjective evil mo-
tive may not be required.230
The abuse-of-power basis for awarding punitive damages should be
clearly applicablie in sexual harassment cases. Sexual harassment was
previously defined as the assertion of power by one sex over the other
-more vulnerable" sex. The harasser perceives himself or herself to be
in the dominant employment position over the other "inferior" em-
ployee in an employment setting which is conducive to an abuse of
power. Depending upon the circumstances of a particular case. a puni-
tive damages award against a defendant guilty of sexual harassment
may be warranted based on the abuse-of-power rationale.
On the other hand, many defendants liable for sexual harassment
have the requisite culpable state of mind. For example. the defendants
in Gurette P. Stauffer Chemical Company sexually harassed plaintiffs by
physically endangering them by placing hazardous chemicals in the
plants above plaintiffs' desks.23 ' This type of conduct can clearly be
termed "malicious." "reckless," "evil." "wanton misconduct." and
"morally culpable."
Additionally, some sexual harassment cases brought under state laws
have resulted in awards of punitive damages.3-' 2 The cases brought
under state laws involved the same or similar factual situations as those
cases brought under Title VII 2" Furthermore, the policy reasons un-
derlying an award of punitive damages, as stated above, support such
an award to a victim in a sexual harassment case.2--4 Like other acts of
sex discrimination, sexual harassment is explained as a means of keep-
ing women in a subordinate and powerless employment position and
the oppressive underpinnings of sexual harassment are manifest. In
some cases, violent means are used to sexually harass employees. -2 3 5 In
many cases the sexually harassed victim experiences severe physical
and psychological harm due to the stressful working environment. -
231) Id
231 518 1: Supp. 521. 523 (D.NJ. 1981).
232 See Skousen v. Nidy. 90 Ariz. 215. 219. 367 P.2d 248. 250 (19611: K)rnazi v. Western Elec
Co. 461 F. Supp. 894. 950 (D.N.J. 1978).
233. See Skousen v. Nidy. 90 Ariz. at 218. 367 P.2d at 249 (forceful and violent indecent
scxual assault-: Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co.. 461 F. Supp. at 950 (same facts that support Title
VII claim support tort of malicious interference with employment).
234. See. e.g.. Vermuelen. upra note 32. at 294: Legal Remedies. supra note 218. at 151-52: C.
M At KI:-.o.rupra note I. at 47 ("sexually harassed women feel humiliated, degraded. ashamed.
embarrassed, and cheap. as well as angry"): L. FARLEY. upra note 21. at 15 (oppressiveness of
sexual harassment is reflected through its aggressive nature and through its attempt to maintain
women's subordinate position).
235. See Skouscn v. Nidy. 90 Ariz. 215. 217. 367 P.2d 248. 249 (1961).
236. Working Women's Institute. Research Series Report No. I. supra note I0 (sexually
harassed victims experienced physical symptoms such as nervous stomachs, migraine headaches.
loss of appetite; and emotional and psychologial feelings such as anger. fright, being upset. and
guilt): Working Women's Institute. Project Statement: Serual larassment on Mhe Job (1975).
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An award of punitive damages to a sexually harassed victim would
have the same purpose and effect of compensation for metal anguish as
an award of punitive damages has in other cases. Similarly, sexual ha-
rassers would be punished for their conduct and deterred from repeat-
ing it.
The exclusion of compensatory damages from recoverable relief
under Title VII. aside from an award of back pay. lost employment
benefits. and attorney's fees, is much less excusable than the exclusion
of punitive damages. Compensatory damages are the actual damages
incurred by the injured party. Compensatory damages include "out-of-
pocket, or pecuniary losses, as well as compensation for physical and
mental suffering."2 ' Courts consider damages for pain and suffering
to be compensatory in nature even though the damages are neither pe-
cuniary nor guided by any market value.23  Pain and suffering -in-
cludes any form of conscious suffering, both mental and physical.
except that substantive law may exclude recovery for mental pain in
limited circumstances."2-" Such limited circumstances concern juris-
dictions where a "'physical impact" is required before pain and suffer-
ing damages are awarded.2 '"
Whether a physical impact is involved in a particular sexual harass-
ment situation, a damage award for pain and suffering should be con-
sidered on a case-by-case basis. Sexual harassment at the workplace
may result in serious psychological and physical suffering. Studies
have indicated that sexually harassed victims experience psychological
symptoms. such as nervousness, fear, and anger and physical symp-
toms. such as nausea. headaches, and tiredness.2 '' An award of dam-
ages for pain and suffering may be particularly suitable for a sexual
harassment case because the victim would not have to prove that the
defendant intended harm.2 2 Some employees and supervisors may ac-
tually believe that some acts of sexual harassment are innocent or flat-
tering.2 4' Others intend to cause suffering by sexually harassing an
(Se.t.l harasnment "rcartcs an intolerable and stressful %,orking condition hazardous to mental
health"). I. -.i ai . ruipra note 21. at 17. Iquotang social psschoilogsts Ilarriet Connoll% And
Judith (;reenwald -All sexual harassment is a stressful experience and ego functioning may %ell
he %ertouslv impaired. The %ictim is violated either physically or pschologiclly and she expcr-
iences a loss of autonom,, and control.-)
237 Mack v. Johnson. 430 F. Supp. 1139. 1149 (E.D. Pa. 1977). ail'd 582 F.2d 1275 13d cir
1978)
23M. D Dooas. supra note 225. at 545.
239. Id at 544-45 ifootnotes omtttcd).
240 Id at 545 n.36 iltting W. PROSSLR. ToRT. § 54 (4th cd. 1971)).
241 See rupra note 14 and accompan)tng text.
242 Se 1) Doi as. supra note 225. at 136. Professor Dobbs explained that pain and suffering
i, usually inflicted without intending harm. for example. as in personal injury negligence case%.
Id.
243 (-f Fifteen percent of the 9000 women surveyed in the Redhook Study described % exual
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If the requisite intent exists, one accused of sexual harassment might
be liable for damages for the intentional invasion of an employee's
"dignitary rights or interest."" Some examples of claims in violation
of one's dignitary interest include assault, battery, false imprisonment,
malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, in-
tentional interference with voting, and statutory civil rights viola-
tions.2 43 In these types of cases, the "damages are 'presumed,' or the
wrong is said to be damage in and of itself."2 6 Professor Dobbs noted
that in some cases the tort appears to be a special version of inflicting
emotional distress, for example, a battery case where the contact was
merely "'offensive."' 24' A sexual harassment case might involve an of-
fensive contact. For example, in Tomkins v. Public Service Electric &
Gas Company. when defendant sexually propositioned plaintiff in a
restaurant, he also physically restrained her when she attempted to
leave. 2'
When considering compensatory damages for invasion of dignitary
interest, the defendant's motive and conduct are pertinent because they
influence a plaintiffs feelings of outrage and distress.249 The psycho-
logical and physical suffering which a sexually harassed employee ex-
periences would increase if the defendant's acts became more hostile,
more persistent, and physical. Moreover, when pecuniary losses are
related to an invasion of dignitary interest, "special damages" may be
awarded to a plaintiff.230 Special damages relate to losses such as "loss
of time, reputation, emotional tranquility, credit standing and others,
and. . . 'all other losses' are likewise recoverable if proximately result-
ing from the wrong."2 -5 1 Many sexual harassment cases include pecuni-
ary losses in terms of back pay and lost employment benefits. An
award of special damages would compensate a sexually harassed victim
for losses not recoverable under the limited remedies in Title VII.
Sexual harassment claims may be analogous with those for pain and
suffering and invasion of dignitary interests. Many sexually harassed
victims experience the physical and psychological suffering that forms
harassment as "flattenng.'" but most considered a sexual pass as a 'hollow compliment."
Redbook Study. supra note II. at 217.
244. See D. DOBBS. .upra note 225. at 528.
245. Id at 528-29 (footnotes omitted).
246. Id at 528 (footnotes omitted).
247. Id at 530 (citing Edminsten v. Dousette. 334 S.W.2d 746 (Mo. App. 1960)). The Edmin-
sten case involved an award of $250.00 for actual and punitive damages for an indecent assault
which involved plaintiff placing his hand on defendant's hip and pushing his lower part of his
body against defendant. 334 S.W.2d at 749.
248. 568 F.2d 1044. 1045 (3d Cir. 1977).
249. D. DOBBS. supra note 225. at 530-31.
250. Id at 531.
251. Id (footnote omitted).
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the basis for a damage award for pain and suffering. Although many
sexual harassment claims may not support tort claims of the dignitary
interests type, the analysis would show that the underlying rationale of
an award of damages is applicable to a sexual harassment case. It is
quite conceivable that a sexually harassed victim will not be fully com-
pensated for his or her injury by an award of back pay, lost employ-
ment benefits and attorney's fees. Furthermore, an award of
compensatory damages may be necessary to make the injured person
whole in the employment context, which is an underlying policy of Ti-
tle VII.' 2 The damages recoverable under Title VII are inadequate
and incomplete when an employee is discriminated against on the basis
of sexual harassment. Title VII does not consider the mental anguish
of the victim and the outrageousness of the harasser's conduct.
Another problem, mentioned earlier with the discussion of employer
liability, involves the necessary proof a victim must put forth to state a
good cause of action for sexual harassment under Title VII. 2-" Because
the courts have articulated different standards of proof. plaintitt's must
prove they were sexually harassed based on their sex2 " and the harass-
ment was a policy or practice of the employer. 2" A victim of sexual
harassment may not be able to recover under Title VII if the harass-
ment involved one single incident no matter how despicable the con-
duct: or male and female employees are sexually harassed by the same
employer or co-workers at the same time.25
It is conceivable that one single sexually harassing act could be so
atrocious that an employee would be forced to quit.2 "' It is also con-
ceivable for both male and female employees to be sexually harassed
by the same employer at the same time albeit for different reasons.
Moreover. it is conceivable that a working environment where one em-
ployee is sexually harassed would be equally offensive and degrading
to co-employees. 2 8 Thus, Title VII does not offer complete relief in all
sexual harassment situations: some victims will not have a remedy.
252 See rupra note 222 and accompanying text.
253 Set..upra notes 195-203 and accompanying text.
254. See SMunford v. James T. Barnes & Co.. 441 F. Supp. 459. 465 E.L). Mach 19771. ilelan
% Johns-Manville Corp.. 451 Supp. 1382. 1389 ID. Colo. 1978).
255. See Bundv v. Jackson. 641 F.2d 934.953 (D.C. Czr. 1981). Wilham v. Saxbc. 413 F. Supp,
654. 660 D D.C. 1976). rer'dsub noma on other grounds and remanded Williams v. Bell. 587 :.2d
1240 (D.C. Car. 1978).
256. See Come v. Bausch and Lomb. Inc.. 390 F. Supp. 161. 163 (D. Ariz. 1975). racated and
remanded. No. 75-1857 (9th Car. July 28. 1977).
257 See. eg. Continental Can Co. v. Minnesota. 297 N.W. 2d 241 (Minn 1980) (where the
%cxudl harassment plaintlffexperienced while at work included a co-worker approaching plaintifr
from behind and grabbing her between the legs while she was bending over working at a
niachine). Id. at 244.
258 See Wocrmer v Brzcczxk. 519 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. IIl. 1991) (where male co-worker was
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2. Faults with the EEOC Guidelines
The EEOC guidelines on sexual harassment are not the law. Thus.
they do not have the same legal force and effect as legislatively imposed
statutes .25 " Although the EEOC guidelines have been given "great def-
erence" by the courts in interpreting Title VII.2  courts are not bound
to accept the guidelines.2 '" In fact. the EEOC guidelines on sexual
harassment have not yet been sanctioned by the United States Supreme
Court. Without the approval of that Court. some lower courts may be
reluctant to use the guidelines when interpreting Title VII in a sexual
harassment case.
Moreover. there are faults with the guidelines. First. the definition of
sexual harassment set forth in the guidelines is not comprehensive: it
does not cover fully all incidents of sexual harassment in the work-
place.2 2 The guidelines fail to include nonverbal sexually harassing
conduct. For example. sexual jokes and cartoons directed at an em-
ployee for the purpose of harassing him or her are not covered. This
type of harassment may be meant to denigrate, humiliate, and torment
the worker for invading the harasser's territory.263 The tone of the
guidelines does not show that this type of sexual harassment perpe-
trated upon the employee is as denigrating to the employee as solicita-
hara,,,ed and penalized after complaining to supcrvi or of female co-worker being subjected to
,exual harassment by another supervisor). Id at 519.
Simdlarl). it is quite possible that male co-workers would be offended by the sexual harassment
of female co-workers See Leventer. supra note 68. at 496.
.See also Se'ual Ilarasment and Tide V1I. supra note 34. at 1024 ("All employees in the office.
not just the specific targets. are damaged by the discomfort. degradation, and stigma caused by the
discnminatorv work environment sexual harassment produces.*)
259 See General Elect Co % Gilbert. 429 U.S 125. 141 (1976). rehk denied. 429 U.S 1174
(1977) (citations omitted)
26O See Griggs , Duke Povcr Co.. 401 U.S. 424. 433-34 11971).
261 See 429 U S. at 142-43 See also Comment. Sexual Ilararsment in the IWrA" Place: New
Rule ftr an (ld and Dirti- Game. 14 U.C.D. L. R.v. 711. 727 (1981) Ihereinafter cited as Seual
flaarrment in the IWorA Place I (California courts are bound by the state's regulations prohibiting
sexual harassment )
262 For an interesting perspective on this issue. si-. McLain. supra note 52. at 288-96.
263 Yee. e.g.. Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co.. 461 F. Supp. 894. 934 (D.N.J. 1978). where the
court stated:
It was Kyriazi's testimony that these three young men teased and tormented her. That they
made loud remarks concerning her marital status, and trumpeted their speculations and even
made wagers concerning her virginity. . ITihey treated her with contempt and ridicule and
attempted to denigrate her position as a professional.
lAIs a part of the attempt by these three co-workers to humiliate her. they created an obscene
cartoon and that she saw Armstrong la co-worker] place it on her desk.
Id The court emphasized that -this cartoon was created, disseminated and ultimately thrust upon
this plaintiff to humiliate her as a woman.- Id (emphasis in original).
This type of denigrating sexual harassment may also result in the employee being physically
endangered. See. e.g.. Guyette v. Stauffer Chem. Co.. 518 F. Supp. 521. 523 (D.N.J. 1981) (em-
plo.es were sexually harassed by coworkers placing dangerous chemicals in the plants above
their desks).
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tions for sexual relations."2
Second. the guidelines' subsection, entitled "other related practices."
involves an employee's submission to an employer's sexual advances to
gain employment benefits at the expense of other qualified employees.
This subsection has been criticized by commentators on two distinct
grounds.": One line of criticism explains that this subsection supports
and recognizes the sexist stereotype that women "sleep their way to the
top._,-
Criticism has also evolved around hypothetical application to possi-
ble claims. If a female employee submits to her male employer's sexual
advances and receives employment benefits, only male co-workers
would be able to put forth a discrimination claim based on sex.' "
Other female co-workers who were qualified for the employment bene-
fits. but were either not given an opportunity to submit to the em-
ploycer's sexual demands or declined such opportunity. would not have
been discriminated against on the basis of sex."' The female co-
worker would not have a valid claim of sex discrimination because the
person who received the employment benefit was another female co-
worker.2" This criticism could not be supported. however, if the fe-
male co-worker, who was denied an employment opportunity for her
refusal to submit to sexual relations, had a valid claim of being sub-
jected to a discriminatory work environment.27 "
Another controversial issue concerning the guidelines involves the
definition and extent of employer liability. An employer is strictly lia-
ble for the sexually harassing acts of its supervisors and agents irrespec-
tive of the employer's knowledge of this conduct. - 7' On the other hand.
the employer is liable for the sexually harassing acts of its employees
264 .5e e.%tual Ilar.i.srnen in the Wo'rA Place. supra note 261. at 725-29. C-' At)om\
Comi § 7287 6 (1980) which prohibits "'Ivlerbal harassment. e.g.. epithets. derogatory cofimcnt,
or slur%** and "'Iva.-ual forms of harassment. e.g.. derogatory posters. cartoon, or dra .ings.'"
265 See McLain. supra note 52. at 296-97: Levcntcr. .sura note 68. at 485.
266 Lc.center. supra note 68. at 485 l.cventer explained "tlht,, as a destruciae tcfrcotpc
whach has traditionally victimized women who try to compete in a malc-dominatcd ,,orkplacc'"
Id Cf Waks & Starr..rpra note 61. at 374-75 (some women cmployees suffer no direct emplo,-
ment consequences from sexual harassment because they submit to the sexual (favors}.
267. McLain. supra note 52. at 296-97. C. Levcntcr. jupra note 68. at 491 (other consadCra-
lions are involved here because "sexual harassment is obscene, involves lewd remarks, getut:,,.
embarrassment and humilitation").
268. McLain. supra note 52. at 296-97.
269. Id at 297.
270. In her footnotes. McLain refers to a racial discrimination case where a white had %land-
ing to complain of a discrimnatory environment. See id at 297 n.125 (citing Waters v. Icublcin.
Inc.. 547 F.2d 466. 469-70 (9th Cir. 1976). cert. denied. 433 U.S. 915 (1977)). See afur l.eventer.
supra note 68. at 496 (**Because no one would want to be the victim of sexual harassment and
because it is possible to imagine oneself as a victim, identification or empathy for the victim could
occur and operate as an underlying basis for a finding of discrimination").
271 29CFR. § 1604.11 (1982).
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and nonemployees only when the employer, or its agents or supervi-
sors. knows or should have known of this conduct "unless it can show
that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action."2' -' When
considering the employer's liability for the sexually harassing conduct
of nonemployees. the employer's control over and legal responsibility
for the nonemployee should be reviewed.27 3
When considering the policy underlying strict liability of the em-
ployer for the acts of its supervisors and agents. the distinction made
regarding the employer's liability for its co-worker's acts is misplaced.
An employer is held strictly liable for the acts ot its supervisory person-
nel because the supervisor, acting on behalf of the employer, has the
authority to make employment decisions refarding hiring, firing, pro-
motions. work assignments and transfers.2  Because the supervisor
has been authorized to act on behalf of the employer and placed in an
influential position regarding employees' employment advancement
and status, the employer must bear the responsibility of the supervisor's
acts or conduct.27: Moreover. the employer is benefitted from this dele-
gation of authority.2 "7
Although not in a supervisory position. co-workers may also influ-
ence others' employment opportunities.27' In fact. sexually harassing
of co-workers provides the main justification for many employees who
feel forced into quitting.2 "  Moreover. courts have liberally construed
"employer" under Title VII to include "'any party who significantly af-
fects access of any individual to employment opportunities, regardless
of whether that party may technically be described as an 'employer' of
an aggrieved individual as that term has generally been defined at com-
mon law."::
A representative from the Working Women's Institute has stated:
"itihe impact of co-worker harassment on a woman's job productivity
272 Id
27 Id
2-4 See Miller Bank of America. 600 F 2d 211. 213 (9th Cir 1979): Flower. v Crouch-
Walker Corp 552 F 2d 1277. 1282 (th Cmr 1977). Tidwell v. American Oil Co.. 332 F. Supp. 424.
436 (1) Utah 1971.
275 See id
276 W PitossIR. supra note 223. at 459. Ste also Taub. Keeping 15omnen in Their Place. Ster-
eoi)ping Per Se as a Form of Emplorment Discrimrnaton. 21 B.C.L. Rlsv. 345. 378 ((1980):
Vcrniuclen. supra note 32. at 290.
277 See Kyvrazi v. Western Elec. Co. 461 F. Supp. 894. 934-39 (D.N.J. 1978); Guyette v.
Staulrer Chem. Co.. 418 F. Supp. 521. 523 (D.N.J. 1981).
278. See. e.g.. Guyette v. Stauffer Chem. Co.. 518 F. Supp. 521 1D.N.J. 1981). where plaintiffs
alleged that co-worker (and supervisors) sexually harassed them resulting in constructive dis-
charge. See also Vermuelen. supra note 32. at 290-91: -coworkers ... are perfectly capable of
making it difficult. if not impossible. for a woman to do her work and indeed, of forcing her to
Ica'e the rob.'
279. Vanguard Justice Sot'y. Inc. v. Hughes. 471 F. Supp. 670. 696 (D. Md. 1979). See also
Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson. 488 F.2d 1338. 1342 (D C. Cir. 1973).
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is at least as extensive as that of supervisory personnel. It is arguably
even greater, as a woman must often rely on the cooperation and sup-
port of her co-workers to learn her job and to do it properly. "2 140 Co-
workers, in many instances, have the ability to affect another co-
worker's employment opportunities. Through an application of the
same rationale underlying the employer's liability for supervisors' ac-
tions, employers should be strictly liable for co-workers' conduct.
Employers should also be liable for co-worker's conduct because em-
ployers are better able to bear the costs of their employee's sexual har-
assment of other employees. They are in a better position to -spread
the loss" when compared to the employee's position.- More impor-
tantly, employers profit from the work of their employees: a sense of
"equity" suggests that employers should therefore be liable for the
wrongs suffered by the employees in the employer's work place. If the
employee is harassed in the employment context while the employer is
earning profits. the harassed employee should not be left without a
remedy when the harassing employee is unable to provide relief.2'2
Another reason justifies the employer's strict liability for employee's
sexually harassing conduct. If the employer is held strictly liable, there
would be a great incentive for the employer to eliminate all sexually
harassing conduct from the workplace. The employer would be
strongly encouraged to establish and effectively maintain an anti-sexual
harassment policy and an easily accessible complaint procedure. as
well as enthusiastic enforcement of appropriate and eflicacious
sanctions.
E. Tort Remedies for Sexual Harassment
Recognizing the incompleteness of Title VI1 as a remedy for sexual
harassment, tort law has been suggested as being better suited to rem-
edy the harm done to sexually harassed victims.:!" The following torts
are discussed to determine whether existing tort law can adequately
address a sexual harassment claim: battery, assault, and intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress.
1. Battery
A co-worker or supervisor could be held liable for battery if she or
"he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the per-
280. Vermuelen. supra note 32. at 291. See also A''riazi. 461 F. Supp 894 4D.N.J. 1978) A
co-worker's tactics may be more subtle than the employer's and. therefore. more dilicult to
document.
281. See general/. Legal Remedies. supra note 218.
282. Id at 159.
283. See Guide io Tort Actions. supra note 34. McLain. supra note 52. at 330-36; Onegha &
Cornelius. sup-ra note 70. at 58-51: Legal Remedies. supra note 218. at 167-75.
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son of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such
conduct, and. . . an offensive contact with the person of the other di-
rectly or indirectly results." 2 An action for battery would protect the
worker's right to be free from any intentional and unpermitted contacts
with the worker's person. 2 5 But not just any contact with a person's
body will give rise to a battery action; it must be an "offensive" contact.
A contact is considered offensive "if it offends a reasonable sense of
dignity.126 Thus. a sexually harassing employee or supervisor may be
liable for contacts that are "offensive and insulting." 2" In fact, even if
the worker or supervisor is attempting a benign compliment or joke. he
or she may be held liable if a reasonable sense of dignity is offended. 2'
In many instances of sexual harassment where an offensive contact
occurs, a harassing worker may be held liable for a battery. Rogers v
Loews L 'Enfant Plaza Hotel2" would clearly support this conclusion.
In Rogers plaintiff, an employee at the hotel, alleged that the supervisor
made advances toward her by pulling her hair.2  The court explained
that this allegation was sufficient to state a claim of battery.2"'
In most sexual harassment cases, the sexual abuse is verbal.2 2 The
necessity of a nonconsensual touching in a battery claim would fore-
close the use of this tort for most sexually harassed victims. Obviously.
if the sexual harassment consisted of a polluted and offensive working
environment, or employment benefits taken away for refusal to submit
to a supervisor's sexual advances, the victim would have no remedy
under a battery claim.
2. Assault
A cause of action for assault is closely related to a cause of action for
battery: therefore, the claims are usually brought together. Liability for
assault is found if she or "he acts intending to cause a harmful or olren-
sive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an immi-
nent apprehension of such contact, and. . . the other is thereby put in
such imminent apprehension."2'-. An action for assault protects the
2X4 R.STA1 1.MI-%T (St.(H oN)) (oi TORTS § 18 (1977) Ihcreinafter cited as RN%.1ATh-..TJ.
28(5. W. PROSSER. supra note 223. at 34.
286 RESTATEMENT. supra note 284. § 19.
287. W. PRossrR. s'upra note 223. at 36.
288. Id Prosser also explained that "Itlakng indecent liberties with a woman without her
con.sent s of course a batterv." Id at 36-37 n.85 (citations omitted).
289 526 F. Supp. 523 (D.D.C. 1981). See also Edminsten v. Dousctte. 334 S.W 2d 746 (Mo
App. 19601: Skousen v. Nidy. 90 Ariz. 215. 367 P.2d 248 (1961).
290. Id at 529.
291. Id
292. See Crull Stress Effects Study. supra note 14: Merit Systems Protection Board Stud-.
.pra note 13. at 24.
293. RISTATEMENT. s.upra note 24. § 21.
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right to be free from an apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact,
and not from an actual contact itself.- While an actual physical con-
tact is unnecessary, an apprehension of a contact is essential. Further-
more, mere words will not suffice for stating a successful cause of action
for assault. 2" Usually force must be threatened and apparent ability
and opportunity to carry out the threat immediately must be evident.2 1
Assault is considered a mental invasion; therefore, feelings of fright
and humiliation resulting from an assault may give rise to a successful
cause of action.29 7
In Rogers plaintiff also alleged a cause of action for assault by stating
that "she was frightened and embarrassed by defendanti's . . . actions
.. .and was put in imminent apprehension of an offensive contact
.... • , Defendant's sexually harassing actions included verbal and
written sexual advances, comments about plaintiffs sexual life, and
physical touchings, including pulling plaintiffs hair.2  Based upon
these allegations, the court stated that plaintiff sufficiently alleged a
claim for assault and denied defendant's motion to dismiss the com-
plaint." ° In Skousen &v Nidy3 ° ' plaintiff was awarded actual and puni-
tive damages for defendant's "indecent assaults."3' t2- " The facts of
Shousen appeared more closely related to battery because the "assaults
consisted of the defendant placing his hand upon the private parts of
the plaintiff and attempting to seduce her."1303
Nevertheless, a cause of action for assault, like battery. is an incom-
plete remedy for most sexual harassment victims. Despite a few suc-
cessful cases, the requirements necessary for meritorious claims are too
stringent. First, a sexually harassing supervisor or co-worker must en-
gage in verbal harassment, including sexual comments and jokes.-"
Second, the harassed worker would have to imminently expect the
threat of contact to occur. Most sexually harassing supervisors or co-
workers would not first warn victims of their imminent physical sexual
contact. The harasser would unlikely say "if you do not submit to my
sexual advances right now, I am going to force myself on you". and
294. W. PROSSER. supra note 223. at 37.
295. Id. at 39.
296. Id
297. Id Prosser notes a case where a cause of action for assault was upheld because the de-
fendant placed plaintiff in fear by leaning over her bed and making an indecent proposal. Id
(citing Newell v. Whitcher, 53 Vt. 589 (1880)).
298. 526 F. Supp. at 529.
299. Id at 525-26.
300. Id at 535.
301. 90 Ariz. 215. 367 P.2d 248 (1961). Accord Edmisten v. Dousctte. 334 S.W.2d 746 (Mo.
App. 1960).
302. Id at 219. 367 P.2d at 250.
303. Id. at 218. 367 P.2d at 249.
304. See Crull Stress Effects Study. supra note 14.
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then make a move toward the victim. Mere words would not constitute
an assault.-*
3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress may
be considered in the developing stage. Although most jurisdictions rec-
ognize the claim when there is a showing of physical injury, only a few
recognize a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress without a physical injury.-' The most common test for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress requires outrageous conduct by
the defendant, an intent to cause emotional distress, actual emotional
distress and physical harm caused by defendant's conduct." 7
Although the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is a
better claim for sexual harassment victims than the torts of assault and
battery. its use would still not provide a complete and adequate rem-
edy. Despite the few sexual harassment incidents that would factually
comply with the requirements of an intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim,"" many do not, and would not, for the following
reasons.
First, although physical harm is experienced by many sexually
harassed victims, most suffer from psychological harm. " ' Second. the
co-worker's or supervisor's conduct must be "outrageous." Arguably.
all sexual harassment is outrageous conduct.3 ' but a court would be
bound by the legal interpretation of -outrageousness' under the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. A defendant will be held
liable where the conduct goes "beyond all possible bounds of decency
and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community." " Considerihg the conservative nature of most courts, it
is highly improbable that most sexual harassment incidents would be
considered outrageous. except for the ones that would probably fall
under another cause of action (battery). Third. courts may be reluctant
to find that the defendant manifested the requisite intent. Many ha-
rassers honestly believe they are flattering other employees by paying
them sexual attention. Others intend to sexually harass, but may not
intend to cause emotional distress.
305 RiS74T I MINT. vupra note 284. § 31 comment a.
306 For example. California recognizes a cause of action for intentional infliction of emo-
lional distresm without a showing of physical injury. See State Rubbish Collectors A.,,'n %
Silznolr. 38 Cal 2d 330. 338. 240 P.2d 282. 2X6 (1952):see general//. MoRRis TORTS I9l-95 42d
cd gxIJ)
307 See Ri .u.mI. s1.upra note 214. § 46.
30 See Rogers v Loews LEnfant Plaza hlotel. 526 F Supp 523. 529-31 ().1) C IY 1)l
31? See Crull Stress Effects Study. supra note 14. at 7.
310 See Guide to Tort Actions. .. pa note 34. at $94.
311 R,% iIivmi'.ie. fupra note 284. § 46 comment d
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Based upon the consideration of the assault. battery, and intentional
infliction of emotional stress, tort law fails to provide a complete and
adequate remedy to sexually harassed victims. Although other areas of
tort law. state and federal constitutional law, and union arbitration and
representation may provide relief in particular circumstances, a remedy
specifically tailored to the sexual harassment situation is needed.
IV. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
The foregoing discussion considered sexual harassment as a recog-
nized legal cause of action for sex discrimination. Many jurisdictions
recognize a sexual harassment claim under Title VII despite the inade-
quacies of Title VII as a remedial measure. Nevertheless. sexual har-
assment is sex discrimination in the legal sense because both serve the
same purpose or are prompted by the same underlying motive: the
.'superior- male sex's desire to exert dominance, control, and power
over the more "'inferior and vulnerable" female sex. For precisely the
same reason, sexual harassment should be recognized as sex discrimi-
nation in the economic sense. Economic analysis of sexual harassment
provides two bases upon which to equate sexual harassment and sex
discrimination: sexual harassment is a 'form" of sex discrimination.
and sexual harassment results in negative economic consequences.
These two bases are considered the "'twofold economic impact" of sex-
ual harassment.
To support the suggestion that sexual harassment is sex discrimina-
tion when analyzed economically. three economic discrimination theo-
ries can be applied to a sexual harassment situation. Theories are most
useful for explaining certain types of behavior when their conditions or
assumptions are closely related to the actual market conditions so that
predictions will be valid. Present discrimination theories, however, fail
to address sex discrimination in terms of sexual harassment. Neverthe-
less, the economic models support. in part. the proposition that sexual
harassment is an enforcement mechanism or form of sex
discrimination.
A. Application of Economic Models
Brief summaries of the three most prominent economic discrimina-
tion theories are outlined below.
The seminal work in this area was done by Gary Becker, although
his analytical emphasis was race discrimination. 312 Becker claims,
however, that the analysis is equally applicable to sex discrimina-
312 ,; Bh., Ki-k. E(o,.o-nts i ,- DJS RMINA1ION 12d ed. 1971). Becker's ,hcorv wa,. rst
pubihed in 1957
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tion.313 Becker's theory involves the premise that "if an individual has
a 'taste for discrimination,' he must act as if he were willing to pay
something, either directly or in the form of a reduced income, to be
associated with some persons instead of others."3 "4 He assumes there is
a perfectly competitive market and wages are flexible."' Becker's the-
ory concludes that men in the labor force will be paid more than wo-
men to compensate them for the additional cost involved in their "taste
for discrimination. '31 6
In addition to the criticism of Becker's theory by women econo-
mists.3 '" his theory is particularly inadequate when considering sex dis-
crimination in the form of sexual harassment. First. Becker's
assumption of a perfectly competitive market is unrealistic and too con-
strictive. Although sexual harassment may occur in a market that is
close to a standard competitive market, if one exists, the pervasiveness
of sexual harassment transcends all markets.?'
Second, Becker's theory is based on the understanding that an em-
ployer will discriminate because he or she has a prejudice or a "taste
for discrimination." This assumption is better suited for a model con-
cerning race discrimination. Prejudice may not even be a factor in the
practice of sex discrimination, especially sexual harassment" In sex-
ual harassment situations the male worker would have to be within
physical proximity to the female worker for the male worker to sexu-
ally harass the female worker. Although no studies have been con-
ducted regarding the harasser's attitudes, male employees generally do
not mind being associated with and working around female employees.
Male employees may, however, dislike working with women on an
equal level or superior level.
Third, Becker's model considers wage differentials between those
discriminated against and those not discriminated against 2 " Although
sex discrimination may result in different wage rates because of one's
13. IM at II.
114. Id at 14
315 Id at 17
316 Id at Ix
317 See J | i m. t,,, .. Tin. Eco.o .tics ol Si:x Dist RsIIxATON 0l'973): C. L ovl)
& B NIMI. Tin b( o,.osii s OI Sx.x DII-I-ERENTIALS (1979).
318 Although seweral studies indicate the pervasiveness ofsexual harassment in dillercnt oc-
cupatlions. the, do not %pecilically show that sexual harassment occurs in competitive. monopolls-
tic. olgopolistlc or monopsonistic markets. It is assumed, however, that because sexual
harassment is "pandemic-an everyday. ever)where occurrence." sexual harassment is not limited
to competitive markets. See Redbook Stud%. mupra note II.
319 See Xenerali' J MAIDN. nipra note 317. (Y" L. Tiukiow. GI.,i R-il(. I.QUt.irY
MI CI'ISA.%IS%.S O t1iSTRIBUTION IN Till U.S. E( ONOtY 130 11975 Ciilhc net impact is discrimi-
nation against women as a group and as individuals even though there is not a basic taste for
discrimination against women").
320. Ye'e G BIrcKi R. rupra note 312.
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sex. sexual harassment is not a direct result of wage differentials. Sex-
ual harassment is, however, related to lower wages and salaries because
a raise or promotion may not be forthcoming if a female employee
spurned her supervisor's sexual advances.
Another theory of discrimination, proposed by Lester Thurow, is the
..queue theory of the labor market."'3 2' The queue theory suggested
that "workers are arrayed along a continuum in order of their desira-
bility to employers." '32 Thurow explained that desirability consisted of
objective criteria, a worker's potential marginal productivity, and sub-
jective criteria, prejudice and ignorance.3 23 The higher the worker is on
the queue. the more desirable the worker is and the better chance for
employment.32'4 Thus, the people at the lower end of the queue are
more susceptible to changes in aggregate demand and may only be em-
ployed when aggregate demand is at a very high level.32
Thurow applies the model to black employment because blacks may
be found at the lower end of the queue due to prejudice, little educa-
tion and training, and a greater frequency of living in poverty. -2 "
Thurow concludes that greater education, training and the removal of
prejudice. as well as maintaining an "unbalanced" labor market (which
forces employers to hire workers at the lower end of the queue because
workers at the higher end have already been hired) will facilitate the
elimination of discrimination. 2 7
Thurow's theory inadequately explains sexual harassment for several
reasons. First, the queue theory is directed at racial discrimination and
at successful policy instruments to combat both racial discrimination
and poverty. Second, although many workers who are sexually
harassed are found at the lower end of the queue, many workers at the
higher end of the queue are sexually harassed. -N Sexual harassment
transcends all classes of workers, whether they are highly or barely
educated.
Third, subjective criteria, such as an employer's desire to work
around "attractive" women, may place a woman worker higher in the
queue. This type of subjective criteria used in determining a potential
worker's "'desirability" will have a reverse effect in terms of discrimina-
321 L Titt-Row. POVLI-RY ANt) DISCRIM NATION (1969).
322. Id at 48 (footnote omitted).
323. Id. at 48 n.2.
324. Id at 48-49.
325. Id at 49. Thurow does mention the costs associatcd with a high level of aggregate de-
mand inflation.
32t. Id at 53.
327. Id at 64-65.
328 See Cnil Stress Effects Study. supro note 14 (indicating that of the 262 women in the
study population. 30% of the women who held positions as managers. administrators. professional
and technical workers experienced sexual harassment on the job).
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tion because a greater number of attractive women will be hired. This
hiring strategy suggests that the employer who partly bases his or her
employment decision on an applicant's attractive appearance may also
be the same employer who is more prone to sexually harass employees.
Thus, a worker may be placed high in the labor queue based upon the
employer's subjective criteria but still be subject to sex discrimination
in the form of sexual harassment.
The Becker and Thurow models were obviously not intended to ad-
dress sex discrimination in the form of sexual harassment. In fact. their
models do not appear to address sex discrimination in any form.
Thurow has acknowledged this weakness since the initial publication of
the queue theory of the labor market. He explained that "[t]he motiva-
tions that lead to racial or religious discrimination just do not make
sense when applied to sex discrimination. ' 132" Thurow also noted that
discrimination is usually explained theoretically as a justification for
achieving the ultimate economic goals of increasing consumption privi-
leges.330 Sex discrimination does not relate to consumption privileges,
but rather, it relates to production opportunities."' Increasing the
wage rates paid to women would lead to higher consumption privileges
for her family which means that male employers should have an eco-
nomic incentive to eliminate sex discrimination." -2 Thus, Thurow con-
cluded that sex discrimination cannot be explained as a technique for
increasing male consumption.3 33
In contrast to Becker and Thurow. Janice Fanning Madden directed
a discrimination theory analysis specifically toward sex discrimina-
tion. 3 Madden proposes a monopsony model explaining a theory of
sex discrimination. 33T She assumes that employers' "monopsony-type
power" arises from a combination of the following:
I. power which rests with one employer because he is the only em-
ployer within the market;
2. power which is shared by several employers who divide a heteroge-
neous labor market so there is limited number of employees per
subdivision of the market;
3. power, which is shared by employers of both sexes and by male
laborers, as a standard of a male supremist society which "exploits"
female laborers. 336
329. L. Tiiustow. supra note 319. at 18M LI
330. Id at 162.
331. Id at 162-63.
332. Id at 163.
333 Id
334 J. MADDEN. supra note 317.
335 Madden loosely defines monopsony as -imperfect competition-" Id. at 69.
336. Id In her monopsony model proposal. Madden considered the previous work done in
this area by Robinson. Bronfenbrenner and Thurow.
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Madden's general monopsony model requires that:
I. The buyer faces an upward sloping labor supply curve: that is.
a. his buying decisions significantly affect the level of market de-
mand, and
b. labor is not supplied at constant cost or wages.
2. Labor supply can be separated into different labor pools.
3. The separated labor pools have different wage elasticities of
supply.r3 I
The first of Madden's three assumptions concerns the existence of
monopsony power. defined as the monopsonist's ability to increase em-
ployment in his or her firm simply by increasing wages. -"' This defini-
tion implies -(a) that the monopsonist must dominate other buyers so
that his buying decisions influence aggregate demand for labor, or
(b) that labor is not available at a constant supply price so that a signifi-
cant change in employment would affect factor price. "' '' The monop-
sonist employs laborers by equating the marginal cost of hiring the last
worker to that worker's marginal revenue product. Absent any dis-
crimination, the wage rates for male workers and female workers are
equal. " '
The second and third assumptions are necessary because monopsony
power alone will not insure the occurrence of discrimination. 4' The
workers must be separated into those receiving the lower wage (those
discriminated against) and those receiving the higher wage. otherwise
the former group would transfer to the latter and discrimination would
be ineffective. Similarly, each group must have different supply elastic-
ities for discrimination to bring monetary gains."42 The monopsonist
maximizes profits, with no information costs, by equating the marginal
rate of technical substitution between females and males with the ratio
of the marginal costs of hiring them. 43 Madden explained that "'the
group 'discriminated against' in the discriminating monopsony model
must have a relatively inelastic labor supply function."' "  She con-
cludes that the level of discrimination is contingent upon the degree of
4monopsony power.1
4 5
. When applying the general monopsony model to sex discrimination.
"monopsony power" is related to "a market in which an implicit or an
explicit collusive sexist agreement (gentlemen's agreement?) exists be-
337. Id. at 72.73
338. Id at 70.
339. Id
340. Id at 71
341. Id
342. Id
343. Id. at 72.
344. Id
345 Id at 76
48
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 [1983], Art. 10
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol14/iss1/10
SEXUAL HAR,4SSMENT
tween employers."' Madden explained that it is profitable for all em-
ployers to agree tacitly on discriminating against women. It is also
profitable for any employer to ignore the tacit agreement and hire
many women at the lower wage. 347 However, that "motivation to dis-
criminate must be. or be made, stronger than the profit motivation. -
34 8
Madden then evaluated the monopsony model in light of three types
of discrimination. Wage discrimination shows that differences in
wages are not based upon relative differences in productivity. Occupa-
tional discrimination relates to the number of a sex employed in a cer-
tain occupation due to artificial barriers with no consideration of
relative productivity. Cumulative discrimination implies that one
worker is less productive than another because of past discrimination
and not because of inherent ability.3 14 In her monopsony model, Mad-
den explained that wage discrimination occurs because it is profitable.
Occupational discrimination depends upon the extent to which em-
ployers and male employees exclude female employees. They use this
power to separate the labor force by sex, to segregate women into "fe-
male" occupations and to earn greater profit. Cumulative discrimina-
tion results when the demand for female labor is lessened by
concentrating women in the less skilled, lower paying jobs, thereby en-
forcing monopsony power.35 Madden suggested that anti-discrimina-
tion policies should be directed at impeding occupational
discrimination to eliminate wage discrimination and dismantling mo-
nopsony power.:-5
Madden's sex discrimination model is an inadequate theoretical ex-
planation of sexual harassment. Her model is primarily focused upon
wage differences between men and women and discriminatory hiring
practices. instead of the actual discrimination they face on the job. For
a general theoretical foundation supporting sexual harassment as sex
discrimination. Madden's model and analysis is revealing however.
The job segregation pay differentials and the powerless employment
position of women are documented economically in Madden's model.
The explanation is relevant because it emphasizes an implicit or an ex-
plicit collusive sexist agreement between male employers to employ
and male employees to work with women only in "women's jobs."
This practice reinforces the traditional employment power structure,
346 Id at 82.
347 Id
34M. Id Madden noted that discriminatory motivation is strengthened by the government's
rcstricting occupations available to women, cumulative discriminatory effects (a worker is less
prtwuctive than another worker because of past discrimination and not because of inherent abil-
at) . pressure by labor unions, and the family decision-making process. Id at 82-84.
349. Id at 2. 87-90.
350. Id at 87-90
351. Id at 101.
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women in subservient positions and men in supervisory positions.
which facilitates the sexual harassment of women employees.
The theoretical economic analysis that employers' behaviors are re-
sponsible for sex discrimination supports the legal argument that em-
ployers should be strictly liable for damages arising out of sex
discrimination. If sexual harassment is considered sex discrimination
legally and economically, then employers should be strictly liable for
sexual harassment. Madden, however, focuses her analysis of em-
ployer responsibility for sex discrimination on an explanation of the
employer's hiring practices and pay differentials. The sex discrimina-
tion in sexual harassment occurs after a woman is hired. Sexual har-
assment concerns the internal workings of an employer's practices and
the discriminatory treatment the woman faces in the employment
context.
B. Twofold Economic Impact
An evaluation of the above-described economic discrimination the-
ory and a review of sexual harassment cases and literature reveals that
sexual harassment has a twofold sex discriminatory economic impact.
First, although economic analysis of sexual harassment as a form of sex
discrimination fails to fit neatly into one of the standard analytical
models, the models do, in part. support an argument that sexual harass-
ment is a form of, or an enforcement mechanism for, sex discrimina-
tion. Second, economic analysis of sexual harassment also supports the
argument that sexual harassment is sex discrimination when consider-
ing its economic impact in the nature of a "consequence" of
discrimination.
I. Sexual Harassment as a "Form" of Sex Discrimination
The models set forth above provide a partial explanation of sexual
harassment as sex discrimination in the economic sense. The models
provide a foundation upon which to build an understanding of sexual
harassment on the job. The economic explanations of sex discrimina-
tion recognize employment situations that facilitate sexual harassment.
Two such situations are occupational segregation and economically in-
ferior employment positions (i.e.. relative subordinate job status). Oc-
cupational segregation, or inferior and subservient employment
positions, and sexual harassment achieve and reinforce the same sex
discriminatory purpose: one self-proclaimed, superior sex, exerting
power, control and dominance over the inferior sex.
Despite the foregoing criticism of Becker's model, his theory sup-
ports the proposition that sexual harassment is an enforcement mecha-
nism for sex discrimination. Some males' tastes for discrimination are
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manifested in their great disdain for association on an equal level with
the opposite sex.3 2 Some men are "prejudiced" against women be-
cause they consider themselves the traditionally more powerful and su-
perior sex. It is socially acceptable for a woman to be a man's
secretary. but not as his equal co-worker. This "taste for discrimina-
tion" is reflected in a desire to keep women in an economically inferior
position to maintain a dominant employment position. Thus, Becker's
theory aids in explaining why women have been occupationally segre-
gated into the low paying jobs with little opportunity for upward
mobility.
Thurow's model also assists in explaining why sexual harassment is
another way to enforce sex discrimination. It slightly modifies the
queue theory to suggest that employers look at separate job queues de-
pending upon the profession or level of skill required for the job. For
example. in an employment situation where nurses, clerical workers.
elementary school teachers, and maids are in great demand, women
would rank high in the labor queue. On the other hand, in a situation
where managers, professionals, assembly line workers, and welders are
in great demand, women would rank at the bottom of the labor queue.
Decisionmakers are usually males. Thus, they influence the composi-
tion of the labor market and have the power to occupationally segre-
gate women into low paying fields or to place women in relatively
inferior and powerless positions.5 3
The preceding subsection -3 51 sets forth how Madden's model lends
support to the proposition that sexual harassment is an enforcement
mechanism for sex discrimination. Madden deserves credit for her
consideration of the attitudes, traditionally held by male employers and
workers, that women should be employed in subservient positions. A
female worker's powerless employment position is reinforced when she
is sexually harassed by her supervisor or co-worker because sexual har-
assment is an expression of dominance.
Although most noneconomist commentators have not analyzed sex-
ual harassment in terms of the economics of sex discrimination, many
have concentrated on,3" or at least acknowleged, 6 economic power
352 Although at is not clearly apparent that Becker considered this particular situation. it
seems to logically follow from his analysis. G. BECKER. supra note 312. at 11-49.
353. See Blumroscn. Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation and Women Workers. 6 WOME-,'s
RTS. L. RiP. 19. 25 (1979-80): Note.Job Related Sexual Harassment and Union Women. 5'7ta are
ther Rights? 10 GOLDEN GATE 929. 930 (1980).
354. See sjpra text accompanying notes 334-51.
355. See generaly L. FARLE.Y..supra note 21; C. MACKn ,N.-o..rupra note I: Vermuelen..supra
note 32. Goodman. Sexual larasment: Some Observations on the Distance Traveled and the Dis-
lance Jet to Go. 10 CAP. UL. REV. 445 (1981).
356 See, e.g.. Adams. Se.rual larasment and the Enrploier-EmplA!ment Relationship. 84 W.
VA L Ri-.v. 789. 790 (1982): Guide to Tart .4ctions. supra note 34. at 880: Comment. Discrmina-
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and traditional roles when explaining sexual harassment in the work-
place. Catharine MacKinnon emphasizes that "[bleing at the mercy of'
male superiors adds direct economic clout to male sexual demands. '- "
MacKinnon explains that women are sexually harassed primarily be-
cause they "occupy infeior job positions and job roles: at the same
time. sexual harassment works to keep women in such positions. Sex-
ual harassment, then. uses and helps create women's structurally infer-
ior status.""31 MacKinnon considers sexual harassment at the
workplace as a means of reinforcing women's subservient traditional
role in the labor force. However, sexual harassment has not been con-
demned, primarily because women's labor force status has traditionally
been inferior. MacKinnon stresses that "[s]exual harassment exempli-
fies and promotes employment practices which disadvantage women in
work (especially occupational segregation) and sexual practices which
intimately degrade and objectify women. " " A woman's equality at
work is undermined because her inferior position is used to force sex-
ual compliance, and her sex is exploited to force her compliance be-
cause she is economically dependent. MacKinnon reveals that
"fw]omen who protest sexual harassment at work are resisting econom-
ically enforced sexual exploitation. " '
MacKinnon explains that the practice of sexual harassment is sex
discrimination because of its "'disparate impact" upon one sex while
claiming to treat both sexes equally. 36 ' Using the -inequality ap-
proach." she argues that prohibiting sex discrimination will facilitate
dismantling the traditional inferior role of women in the labor force.' "
This is so. MacKinnon stresses, because "[the relationship of sexuality
to gender is the critical link in the argument that sexual harassment is
sex discrimination. "' MacKinnon concludes that employment prac-
tices reinforcing women's inferior status are sexually discriminatory.""
Thus, a supervisor's sexual harassment of a female employee is sex dis-
ton-.Se-lurden of Perwoaston Shifv in Remeditl Claim after .tndtni ef/Se tud Haraismnent in
WirA nAironmeni -- Bundy v. Jackson. II SEoN HALL L. Riv. 825. 836 (1981): Rosean. ,upfia
note 29. at 272-73; Comment. .4 Sutre, of Serua llarassment: A 1'rong Redre,.sabe Under /We
17/ On/i When Dfl.rrnitnation is Shown. 8 N Kv. L. Rr:v. 395. 395 (0981): Note. Job ReA/ied
S.-tua/ I/atarmeni and Union Women: l'hat .- re Their Righi tr. 10 Got tN GA I )29 (1980)
357 C MA( KIN--oN. upra note I. at 9
35s, Id at 9-10.
359 Id at 7.
301) Id at 25.
361 Id at 206. Under the disparate impact test. one must show **a pur'x)rtedl% esenhanded
practice has disproponionately linjuredl one sex.-" Id
362 ('f id at 174-92. MacKinnon stated that the inequality approach dealt with lPlractices
Ahtch express and reinforce the social inequality of women to men .... "" Id. at 174
363 Id. at 151.
364 Cf id. at 215-21.
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crimination because the harassment is based on the employee's sexual-
ity. her womanhood, and her inferior economic position.
Although most commentators have not focused on the power issue to
the extent that MacKinnon has. many recognize that sexual harassment
is an assertion of power by men in a superior employment position.
Many of these commentators suggest that this assertion of power is an-
other form of sex discrimination because it reinforces a woman's infer-
ior position in the labor market. Sexual harassment impedes a
woman's opportunity to achieve economic equality.
Some commentators have also suggested that sexual harassment re-
inforces women's labor force positions in the low paying and dead-end
jobs. the traditional "women's jobs."'"" The motive underlying sexual
harassment, men's desire to maintain power and dominance over wo-
men. is the same motive underlying sex discrimination in the form of
occupational segregation. From childhood, girls and boys are socially
conditioned to pattern their lives according to traditional sex roles and
lifestyles.3" Boys are taught to be aggressive and independent. and
girls are taught to be noncompetitive and dependent."" Women have
traditionally been encouraged to enter fields where their positions are
subservient and nurturing by nature, with little or no opportunity for
advancement.'' Because women are in these economically and tradi-
tionally inferior employment positions, they have a greater likelihood
of being sexually harassed. Women are forced to remain in these infer-
ior positions due to sex discrimination manifested as sexual
harassment.
It is not suggested that harassers make conscious decisions to oppress
women, or that they always intend the full consequences of their pur-
portedly innocent and "flattering" actions. Literary observations of in-
cidents of sexual harassment suggest "that male sexual advances may
often derive as much from fear and hatred of women and a desire to
keep them in an inferior place as from a genuine positive attraction or
affection, although the perpetrator may be unaware of his feelings." '
At least one study has found that sexual harassment is considered a
365 See. e.g.. Vcrmuelen. supra note 32. at 285-86- Rosscmn. s ,pra note 29. at 278. Note. Job
Related SVeual llarassment and Union Women: Vhat are Their Righis? 10 GOLDEI-N GATi 929.
931) (19t). see generallr L. FARLE-Y. supra note 21: C. MA('KNNON. supra note I Hooven &
McDonald. The Role of Capitalism- Understanding Sexual Ilarassntent. ALGIs Sept./Oct. 1978. at
27
366. See L FAkI I Y, supra note 21. at 16-17 (quoting social psychologists Harriet Connolly
and Judith Greenwald)
367 Id
36H See Ros.,in. rupra note 29. at 274-75. 278: Redbook Study. supra note II.
369) C. IM KIs.,o.,. jupra note I. at 199. See also Redbook Study. supra note II.
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power issue in the employment context.?' Several studies have con-
cluded that sexual harassment occurs in all types of jobs as well as in
all levels of the employment hierarchy. 1 ' Another study suggests that
women in low payino, traditional "women's occupations" are more
likely to be harassed.3 '2 Conversely, it has been suggested that women
entering traditionally male-dominated fields experience a greater de-
gree of sexual harassment.373
The preceding analysis is applicable to situations in which a female
employee is sexually harassed by a male co-worker. this fact is ex-
plained. in part, by sex role conditioning. and in part by the male co-
worker having an indirectly more powerful position than the female
co-worker. For example, the male co-worker may have seniority over
the female, he may be more experienced in the field, or he may be more
familiar with the supervisors. - 4  If a woman enters a traditionally
male-dominated occupation. the male co-worker may be responsible
for her training.
2. Economic Consequences of Sexual Harassment
Sexual harassment does not occur without correlative economic con-
sequences. Although the exact magnitude of the economic harm is dif-
ficult to quantify scientifically, the economic impact of sexual
harassment has not gone unrecognized. In fact. a few studies have doc-
umented some economic effects attributable to sexual harassment" "
and several commentators have discussed the economic harm exper-
ienced by sexually harassed women) 7"
371) Vee Merit Sistens Protection Board Study. supra note 13. at 29 tciting the llarvard Mui.
ni. Re'iem and Redbho:k joint studyl.
371 See Working Women's Institute. Re.earch Serics Report No I. ruprai note 10. Working
Women*s Institute. Research Series Report No 3. supra note 14: Crull Stress ll'ects Study. tupraJ
note 14. Redbook Study. supra note I I.
372. Working Women's Initute. Research Series Report No I. .rupra note I0. This Stud'.
dicosered that "womcn with lower salaries are more likely to experience physical hara.nient t It
A.,o indicated that "clerical workers and %ailtresses ,ere more likely to be subjected to sexual
harassment than women in other job tcupations..
33 See Merit Systems Protcection Board Study. siupra note 13. at 29. See ulbo .. Fski I N.
upra note 21. at 52-60,
374 See Crull Stress E-fects Study. supra note 14.
375 See Working Women's Institute. Research Series Report No. I..rtpra note 10: Working
Women*s Institute. Research Series Report No. 3..rupra note 14; Crull Stress Effects Study. supra
note 14: .Mcnt Systems Protection Board Study. supra note 13. at 28.
376. See. e.g.. Goodman. 5upra note 355. at 456. 466 (Sexual harassment reduced productivity
and increases absenteetsm)- Vermuelcn. Employter Labhir under Title 17/or Sei %l llarassment
by Superso'r Employees. 10 CAP. U.L. Rt.v. 499. 502. 528 (1981) (sexual harassment is a harrier
to employment opportunities and it reduces job productivity): Se.tual lHaras.rment in the IMrkA
Place. supra note 261. at 712-13. 716 (economic harm in the form of lost job benefits and reduc-
tion in productivity); Waks & Starr. supra note 61. at 569. 581 (unemployment. lost job ,eniority.
absenteeism and poor performance and overall inefficiency): Vermuelen..n/pra note 32. at 2854,8
(reduction in productivity, increases in unemployment and absenteeism. less seniority and barrier
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The Working Women's Institute recently conducted two studies, one
in 1979 involving ninety-two women and another in 1981 involving 262
women.?37 The 1979 study indicated that twenty-four percent of the
sexually harassed women surveyed were fired and forty-two percent
were pressured into resigning.Y'8 Combined results of the two surveys
reveal that seventy-five to eighty-three percent of these sexually
harassed women experienced "interference with job performance" (dis-
traction, avoidance, and loss of motivation),37  which may be consid-
ered a loss in productivity. Both studies also found that ninety to
ninety-six percent of the women surveyed experienced emotional or
psychological stress symptoms (nervousness, fear, anger, sleepless-
ness).3"' Physical stress symptoms (headaches, nausea, weight changes.
tiredness) were reported by twenty to sixty-three percent of these wo-
men. -" ' Both the physical and psychological stress symptoms may also
be considered as adversely affecting a worker's productivity.
Another study. conducted by the Merit Systems Protection Board.
examined government agencies to discover the ramifications of sexual
harassment in the federal government workplace. "s  This study deter-
mined that the cost of sexual harassment to the federal government was
at least 180 million dollars between May 1978 and May 1980. -"3 This
figure represents the cost of replacing employees who left work because
of sexual harassment, the cost of medical insurance benefits and sick
leave, and the cost of reduced productivity. "4 This cost has been esti-
mated to represent fifty dollars per .employee."'8 The Merit Systems
Protection Board Study also indicated that a majority of the employees
who had prior work experience considered that the sexual harassment
encountered in the federal job was no worse than that encountered in
the private industries or in state and local government.3' " This infor-
mation suggests that the cost to a private industry would be no
diff'erent.
to emploment opponunt,). Rosscn..mpra note 34. at 273-74. 277-78. 304 (reduces productivtt'.
increases unemployment, and creates a barrier to employment). Guidemo 7ort .4con.r..rupra note
34. at 881 (increases unemployment). LegalRemred.r. ,rpra note 218. at 169 (lost earnings as well
as lost earning capacity and lost employment opponunities.
377 Working Women's Institute. Research Series Report No 3. rupra noic 14; Crull Stress
Ell'ects Stud%..pra note 14.
378 Working Women's Institute. Research Senes Report No. 3..vupra note 14. at 5
379. Id. Crull Stress Effects Study. mpra note 14. at 7.
3X1). Id.
381 Id The range was noted in the Crull Strcs Effects Study when comparing answers from
their questionnaire (63") with those answers from their clients (2tU ).
38(2 See Merit Systems Protection Board Study. supra note 13
3X3 Id at 28.
384 Id
3X5. Waks & Starr. nipra note 61. at 571
386 Mernt Systems Protection Board Study. supra note 13.
3X7 .Y Waks & Starr. rupra note 61. at 571. stated, when considering the Merit Sytems
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As previously mentioned, several commentators have discussed the
economic consequences sexually harassed victims experience, without
setting forth any newly discovered quantifiable evidence. Nevertheless.
it is important to note that the economic impact of sexual harassment
has not been unnoticed. The observed economic consequences of sex-
ual harassment on the job include a reduction of a worker's productiv-
ity." ' an increase in unemployment due to retaliatory dismissals and
worker resignation. " ' a barrier to employment opportunities including
promotions, advancement, seniority and other job benefits." ' an in-
crease in absenteeism."9 ' lower income due to lost earnings."2 and an
overall decrease in efficiency.-
Other authors have analyzed sex discrimination under another eco-
nomic concept. Although their analysis was not specifically directed
toward sexual harassment. it is. however, applicable to sexual harass-
ment situations. Cynthia Lloyd and Beth Niemi view sex discrimina-
tion in terms of free choices and opportunity costs.' ' In economics, it
is assumed that employment choices are available. Lloyd and Niemi
suggest an examination of a person's choices about participation in the
labor force, experience and training acquired. and a selection of an oc-
cupation in terms of what the person gives up in order to attain some-
thing else." '" When discrimination occurs, however, a worker's free
choices are limited. Lloyd and Niemi contend that employers have
preferences concerning the sex composition of their employees. These
preferences will be reflected in the employer's hiring and promotion
patterns resulting in fewer free choices available for employees.""'
They explain that an employer's preferences may be partially deter-
mined by past realities, such as traditional sex roles."'" Lloyd and
Niemi conclude that employment discrimination against women. irre-
|Iroecetihon Board Stud, -Ii It cannot. of coursc. be a.,.urned Ihat the coti to prl~ate indu,,trk 1II
,orre.,,mnd it) the federal governmcnt's expcrience "
38X8 See Goodman. supra note 355. at 456. Vermuclcn. ., upra note 377. at 52...s.. eiual Ir
as~ment in the IWo4 I'lare. runpra note 261. at "12-13. Wak,. & Starr. vipra note 12. At 5N1.
Verinuelen. rnpra note 32. at 285-8X: Rossean. tupra note 34. .u1 273-74.
3X9. See Waks. & Starr. mpria note 61. at 569. Vermuelen. -upra note 32. at 2N5.8x. Ro,.%ein.
vupra note 34. at 277-78: Guide io Tori .4c'tns. rupra note 34. it ,81
390 See Vertnuelen.supra note 377. at 502. Setual llaras.rmeni in the iJ'rk Place. iupra note
26l. it 712-13. Waks & Starr..supra note 61. at 569. Vermuclen.supra note 32. at 285-88. Ro%,.eln.
.npra note 34. at 304-. Le al Remedies. supra note 218. at 169.
391 See Goodman. supra note 21S. at 466. Waks & Starr. supra note 61. at 567. Vermuelcn.
jupra note 32. at 285-88.
392 See Legal Remedies. supra note 228. at 169.
393 See Waks & Start. supra note 61. at 581
394 C LIt o'w) & B. Nir-MI. supra note 317.
395 Id at 3.
396. Id at 4.
397. Id at 5. LIo:,d and Niemra daagrce with the traditional assumption inolving the indc-
pendence of conm.tramnts on resoure,; and per.onal preference%, Id.
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spective of the cause, results in higher unemployment rates and lower
earnings.- '
In a sexual harssment situation, a worker's "free" choices mav be
limited if he or she refuses the supervisor's or co-worker's sexual ad-
vances. For example. the cost of a promotion may be submission to
sexual advances. The decision must be weighed against the freedom to
choose one's sex partner. Moreover, this cost is not only unrelated to
the necessary qualifications for a promotion, but it is also irrational in
the economic sense. If the main criterion required for the promotion is
submission to sexual advances, the worker may be unqualified for the
actual employment duties and will. therefore, not be very efficient and
productive. This choice has no relation to the typical rational employer
who makes decisions on a profit motivated basis. Thus. the employer's
economic interests are best served through a prohibition of sexual har-
assment on the job since it may decrease potential profits.
Furthermore. the actual costs of sexual harassment are alarming. Al-
though further study and documentation is necessary f.or a more accu-
rate revelation of the costs of sexual harassment, employers should he
economically motivated into prohibiting all forms of sexual harassment
fron the workplace.
V. At-.NmoiEN' TO TITLL VII
The fbregoing discussion proves that laws prohibiting sexual harass-
nent at the workplace need to be revised. A model amendment to Ti-
tle VII must be specifically tailored to the economic impact aifecting
and the remedial needs of sexually harassed victims. The proposed
definition of sexual harassment must include all types of sexually
harassing behavior. Employers are held strictly liable for the sexually
harassing acts of supervisors and employees and remedies include
awards of compensatory and punitive damages. The proposed model's
format is similar to that of the EEOC's guidelines on sexual harass-
ment. except for the few significant changes mentioned above.
Sexual Harassment as a Form of Sex Discrimination:
I. Sexual harassment is a violation of section 703 of Title VII accord-
ing to the following rules.
2. Sexual harassment is any type of behavior, acts. or conduct which
has the cffect'of expressing sexual attention toward another person.
3. The sexual attention is unsolicited and unwelcome, although not
necessarily rejected.
4. Sexual attention includes, but is not limited to. sexual advances.
requests for sexual favors, any other written, printed, verbal. non-
3QX Id at 193
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verbal, or physical conduct of a sexual nature, whether expressed in
a 'complimentary- or derogatory nature.
5. The unsolicited and unwelcome sexual attention occurs within the
employment context and (1) submission to or tolerance of such at-
tention is expressly or impliedly a condition of employment, or
(2) submission to or refusal of such attention is taken into account
when determining employment opportunities, benefits, promotions.
transfer, or demotions pertaining to the sexually harassed em-
ployee, or (3) such attention affects the harassed employee by creat-
ing a demeaning, offensive, uncomfortable, hostile, or intimidating
employment atmosphere.
6. Employers are held strictly liable for the sexually harassing con-
duct of their agents. supervisors, and employees.
7. Employers are held liable for the sexually harassing conduct of
nonemployees (clients or customers) when the employer knows or
should have known of the sexually harassing conduct and if the
employer fails to take immediate effective and corrective action.
The court will consider the extent of control and responsibility the
employer has over the nonemployee.
8. In all sexual harassment cases, courts will consider the totality of
the circumstances to determine the gravity of the sexual conduct
and grant relief accordingly.
9. All of the remedies previously available under Title VII are still
available, as well as an award of compensatory and punitive
damages.
VI. CONCLUSION
Awareness of sexual harassment on the job as a societal evil infecting
traditional notions of equality has increased in recent years. Courts
have ruled in the past several years that sexual harassment is legally
recognized as sex discrimination. The United States Supreme Court
has yet to decide this issue. Although sexual harassment is legally rec-
ognized as sex discrimination under Title VII, legal and economic anal-
ysis discloses three areas where Title VII falls short. First, specific acts
which arguably constitute sexual harassment are not encompassed in
the Title VII case law or the EEOC's definition of sexual harassment.
Second, an employer's liability is limited for the sexually harassing acts
of employees. Third, an award of compensatory and punitive damages
is not allowed under Title VII. These three deficiencies suggest a need
for legislative direction. An amendment to Title VII is proposed.
Economic reasons exist for recognizing sexual harassment as sex dis-
crimination, although most economic scholars have not applied sexual
harassment to standard sex discrimination models. Women workers
have traditionally been in an economically disadvantaged position.
This inferior economic position at work facilitates sexual harassment.
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Legal and economic recognition of sexual harassment on the job as sex
discrimination is necessary in order to promote women's equality in
employment. Although legal and economic recognition of sexual har-
assment may still be at an early stage of development. realization of the
economic and psychological harm experienced by sexually harassed
victims is necessary in order to provide adequate and complete reme-
dial measures. Once accomplished, the traditional employment power
structure that discriminates against women will be altered and the true
potential of women in the labor force will be realized.
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